

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

REPORT OF THE JCS FACT FINDING TEAM

USS LIBERTY INCIDENT 8 June 1967



FT 173

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals.
Not automatically
declassified.
pp. 190

071 Tc - 2308/378

Watch Log

OFF: Major Breedlove

MO: Msgt McNulty

FROM: 07/0730

TO: 07/1930 June 67

TIME LOCAL


MSG/CALL FROM/TO

MESSAGE OR EVENT

ACTION

NOTIFICATION

EGGY TIFE HIFE



TO NAVEUR Galaleott

Passed instructions to hold the USS LIBERTY outside 100 NM of Isreal, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM of Cyprus, per Capt Rorex-Capt Vineyard's instructions. (see classified tape 3. footage 192/210)

TO EUCOM" Russell

passed the above info. to EU. EUCOM. Msg is being dispatched.

2000

2030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I INTRODUCTION

- II FINDINGS OF FACT
 - SECTION 1 - PERTAINING TO COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIONS
 - SECTION 2 - SUPPORTING COMMUNICATIONS

- III RECOMMENDATIONS

- IV SUPPORTING INFORMATION
 - ANNEX A - TERMS OF REFERENCE
 - ANNEX B - ITINERARY
 - ANNEX C - SUMMARY OF MESSAGES
 - TABS 1 THRU 77
 - ANNEX D - COMMUNICATIONS
 - TABS 1 THRU 9
 - ANNEX E - CHARTS
 - ANNEX F - MEMO FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS, DATED 18 JUN 67

PART I

INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(S)~~ At approximately 1210Z, 8 June 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was attacked by Israeli aircraft in the vicinity of 31°-23'N, 33°-25'E. This position was about thirteen (13) miles from the Minaret at El Arish, which was bearing 142°T. LIBERTY was attacked subsequently by Israeli motor torpedo boats at or about 1253Z, 8 June 1967, and was severely damaged. LIBERTY's mission was governed by directives emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. ~~(S)~~ Pursuant to orders approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Fact Finding Team of five members was constituted from the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "... examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 8 June 1967 which terminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 081210Z June 1967."

3. (U) Major General Joseph R. RUSS, USA, was designated senior member. Terms of Reference were also provided. (See Annex A, Part IV)

4. (U) The Fact Finding Team began its examination before the formal approval of the Terms of Reference on the oral authority of the Director, Joint Staff. The activities visited and the person interviewed are listed in Annex B, Part IV, conforming to the following schedule:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place/Activity</u>	
Friday 9 June	Washington, D. C.	Preliminary preparations
Saturday 10 June	Washington, D. C.	Director, J-3 Deputy Director for Reconnaissance J-3 ACNO (COMM) and [REDACTED] representatives
Sunday 11 June	Washington, D. C.	Study and continued preparations
Monday 12 June	Washington, D. C.	[REDACTED] Service Action Officers Mr. Pat COIN, White House Staff
Tuesday 13 June	London; enroute Stuttgart, Germany	USNAVEURCOM USEUCOM
Wednesday 14 June	Stuttgart; enroute COMSIXTHFLT	USEUCOM
Thursday 15 June	On board USS LITTLE ROCK	COMSIXTHFLT
	Enroute and at Malta	USS LIBERTY; Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry; and COMSERVLANT
Friday 16 June	Enroute and in London	{ USNAVEURCOM Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry
Saturday 17 June		
Sunday 18 June	Enroute	
Monday 19 June	Washington, D. C.	{ Senior Aide, Office of CNO; Dep Dir for Reconnaissance; DDO(NMCC)
Tuesday 20 June		

5. (U) Inasmuch as the Fact Finding Team was not a legal investigative body, in conducting its examination the Fact Finding Team observed the following constraints:

- a. Interviews were not conducted under oath.
- b. Individuals were not warned of their rights nor designated as interested parties.
- c. Interference with the Naval Court of Inquiry was avoided.
- d. Impact upon LIBERTY's personnel was held to a minimum.
- e. Representatives of the military services were invited to accompany the team; Captain W. CRAVEN, Office of Chief Naval Operations (OP-03R) and Captain C. A. TURNER, Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR, did accompany the team throughout the European itinerary.

6. (U) No insurmountable difficulties were encountered.

However, note is made of the following:

a. Travel to Asmara is extremely difficult. As a consequence, determination of pertinent facts originating at that location were obtained by telephone and/or by message.

b. The focus of damage and destruction in LIBERTY was on the bridge and in the communications facilities. Consequently, there were no records or communications files surviving which could be examined, nor were there any surviving key communications personnel available who had direct knowledge and reliable power of recall. For this reason the Fact Finding Team accepted such information as the Navy Court of Inquiry had been able to deduce and which was provided by the Senior member, Navy Court of Inquiry.

~~SECRET~~

c. The Fact Finding Team received JCS message 7964, DTG 142258Z June on 15 June on board Flagship, COMSIXTHFLT. This message advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the precept to the Fact Finding Team, and that it had added to the Terms of Reference a requirement to "...incorporate in your report any official US public statements which bear on your findings." Actions to comply with this necessitated obtaining pertinent information and material by other than direct interview in some instances.

7. (U) Compilation of all known official US public statements has been completed. Careful review of these statements reveal that none have a bearing on the findings presented herein. In view of this fact, they are not included as a part of this report but are retained on file in the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group.

8. (U) In Part II, Section I, the Findings of Fact are amplified by discussion. The discussion is provided as a device for making available various opinions which cannot be categorically stated as facts but which contribute to a fuller understanding of the situation relating to the incident under study.

~~SECRET~~

PART II

FINDINGS OF FACT

SECTION 1

PERTAINING TO COMMAND
AND CONTROL ACTIONS

~~SECRET~~

FINDINGS OF FACT

PERTAINING TO COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIONS

1. (S) During May 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) had been operating off the West African coast under the operational control of COMSERVRON 8,* a subordinate command of CINCLANTFLT.

DISCUSSION:

This is the normal command control arrangement for technical research ships (TRS) under the administrative command chain in the Atlantic.**

2. [REDACTED]

DISCUSSION:

a. USNS VALDEZ, as a USNS ship manned by a civilian crew, was not placed under operational control of a USEUCOM subordinate commander.

b. Deployment of USS LIBERTY is the first instance of the operation [REDACTED] in the Mediterranean under the operational control of the area commander since the Cyprus incident.

[REDACTED] (See Tab 3)
** JCS MSG 5838, DTG 052235Z November 65. (See Tab 1)

NOTE: ANNEX C, PART IV, CONTAINS ALL MESSAGES REFERRED TO HEREIN.

~~SECRET~~

3. (b) Subsequent to approval by the JCS/JRC, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 303 Committee, the JCS/JRC, through COMSERVRON 8,* initiated movement of USS LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean by way of Rota, Spain. USS LIBERTY arrived Rota on 31 May where her logistics were completed, SIXTHFLT publications delivered, repairs effected and special technical equipment and personnel boarded.

DISCUSSION:

a. Approval procedure is designed to insure that military implications and capabilities, as well as diplomatic and international political risks and ramifications, are fully weighed.

b. The stop at Rota was required to insure USS LIBERTY would have available the necessary operational and logistics support information providing for coordination and support of her operations in the area.

c. Enroute Rota USS LIBERTY had experienced machinery derangements to the propulsion system and to a significantly important antenna.

d. It was also necessary to provide augmentation of capability by special technical equipment required by her mission;

~~_____~~ personnel also joined at Rota. ~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

*COMSERVRON 8 MSG, DTG 240020Z May 67. (See Tab 4)

~~SECRET~~

4. (S) On 29 May, [REDACTED] submitted* five (5) proposed operating areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and recommended that USS LIBERTY operate in Operation Area 3 (32N-33E to 34E); further, that adjustment in closest points of approach to land and adjustments in the operating areas should be changed as necessary for operational and safety reasons. (See Chart 1, Annex E, Part IV)

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

5. (S) Commanders were made aware of this deployment as information addressees on sailing orders issued** by COMSERVRON 8 to USS LIBERTY to go to the Eastern Mediterranean.

DISCUSSION:

a. Conversations with the respective commanders indicate that this was the extent of knowledge each had regarding the ship's mission. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. It would appear that custom and usage may have enabled this sort of intercommand exchange in [REDACTED] channels to become compartmented. Close monitorship should be exercised over these staff activities by the commander in view of the unusual degree of confidence reposed in these highly-technical, specialized personnel.

[REDACTED]
**COMSERVRON 8 MSG, DTG 240020Z May 67. (See Tab 4)

~~SECRET~~

6. (S) On 1 June 1967, the JCS/JRC directed* USS LIBERTY be passed to operational control of USCINCEUR upon entering Rota and this was accomplished. USCINCEUR, in turn, requested** CINCUSNAVEUR to assume operational control as USS LIBERTY passed sea buoy inbound to Rota.

DISCUSSION:

a. This action is consistent with previous policy guidance disseminated*** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which outlined, among other things, that operational control would be effected by the cognizant unified and specified commander through the Naval component commander to a specific fleet or force commander.

b. It was further noted that the procedures for developing schedules for the USS LIBERTY while in the USCINCEUR area of responsibility were specifically outlined**** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 June 1967.

7. (S) On 1 June USCINCEUR informed# the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the expected ready for sea date (1 June) of USS LIBERTY and requested guidance with respect to schedule, operating areas, and any special requirements. He also instructed CINCUSNAVEUR to establish procedures to insure daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) and Planned Intended Movement (PIM) reports as required by current reconnaissance reporting instructions. CINCUSNAVEUR so instructed USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

This reflects the unfamiliarity with a TRS capability and its performance (i.e., the imposition of transmitting require-

*JCS MSG 6499, DTG 291602Z May 67. (See Tab 7)
**USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 300932Z May 67. (See Tab 11)
***JCS MSG 5838, DTG 052235Z November 65. (See Tab 1)
****JCS MSG 7206, DTG 062050Z June 67. (See Tab 35)
#USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 010035Z June 67. (See Tab 14)

ments which were inconsistent with the mission requirements of USS LIBERTY, but completely prudent for other types of Naval ship operations).

8. (S) CINCUSNAVEUR, assuming operational control of USS LIBERTY on 31 May, instructed* the ship to enter Rota for fuel and loading of technical material and personnel and, when ready for sea about 1 June, to depart for the Eastern Mediterranean. General instructions were given pertaining to staying in international waters and to communications matters. Technical operations were directed in accordance with technical specifications to be issued separately.

DISCUSSION:

a. This directive associates with routine operational matters; [REDACTED]

It is difficult to see how the military judgment of a commander can be exercised without this knowledge.

b. From this message, it is not obvious that "technical direction" would not flow from the commander [REDACTED] and that the commander would not be knowledgeable of such direction.

9. (S) On 1 June, the JCS/JRC provided** USCINCEUR with USS LIBERTY's schedule. This directed USS LIBERTY depart Rota 2 June when ready for sea and proceed during period 2-8 June via Gibraltar Strait thence via Northern African Coastal route to 32N-33E. Closest points of approach to Spain, Tunisia, Sardinia,

*CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 311750Z May 67. (See Tab 13)
**JCS MSG 6724, DTG 011545Z June 67. (See Tab 18)

SECRET

Sicily, Crete, Algeria, and Libya were stipulated. Thereafter, to operate in Operation Area 3 subject to 12.5 NM closest point of approach United Arab Republic and 6.5 NM closest point of approach Israel.

DISCUSSION:

a. This schedule is complete in itself and does not explain the rationale supporting the route or operating position selected. [REDACTED]

LIBERTY was being sent in direct support of the COMSIXTHFLT requirements, as well as those of CINCUSNAVEUR and USCINCEUR. In discussion with these commanders, all disclaimed knowledge of this aspect other than to speculate that, in the course of events, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None felt that USS LIBERTY was available to be responsive to tasks directly imposed by himself.

10. [REDACTED] USCINCEUR passed* action to CINCUSNAVEUR, who directed** USS LIBERTY to proceed as instructed in the schedule previously provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was issued by CINCUSNAVEUR who had delayed action pending receipt of a report from USS LIBERTY that repairs to an antenna had been completed. When so reporting, USS LIBERTY also advised*** that she would depart 1230Z, 2 June, and proceed at best speed.

DISCUSSION:

In the light of future events, the words in USS LIBERTY's report "...proceed at best speed," in accordance with previous

*USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 012030Z June 67. (See Tab 19)
**CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 020717Z June 67. (See Tab 21)
***USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021132Z June 67. (See Tab 22)

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

instructions, are significant. However, this is a significance not readily apparent to readers on 2 June in view of USS LIBERTY's subsequent movements to comply with her understanding of the urgency of her employment reflected in COMSERVRON 8 Movement Directive "...best possible speed." The team was informed that the Commanding Officer of USS LIBERTY stated that this was the first instance in which he had ever been ordered to use best speed.

11. ~~(TS)~~ USS LIBERTY departed* Rota at 1330Z, 2 June. Her movement report conformed to her ordered track and indicated a speed of advance at 15 kts with an estimated time of arrival at Operation Area 3 (32N-33E) of 0300Z on 8 June; thereafter, to operate within a circle of 50 miles radius. This report also advised that USS LIBERTY would guard NAVCOMSTA Morocco teletype broadcast until 0001Z on 7 June when a shift to the NAVCOMSTA Asmara teletype broadcast would be made.

DISCUSSION:

Commands received this movement report and compared the intention with the track USS LIBERTY had been directed to follow - no significant disagreement was apparent. Thereafter, despite unavailability of daily Position Reports (POSIT reports), assumption persisted that USS LIBERTY would be and was where such projections indicated. (This becomes significant on 7 June when USS LIBERTY's 070800Z POSIT report** is received and indicates USS LIBERTY is about one day ahead of assuming commencement of her 9 June assignment.)

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

~~SECRET~~

12. (S) USS LIBERTY reported* its 2400Z position on 2 June and also reported passing three Soviet ships steaming in column. In this report to CINCUSNAVEUR, and various information addressees, USS LIBERTY cautioned that daily situation and position reports might be delayed to avoid transmitting at times which would have a deleterious effect on the execution of the primary mission. This was received by CINCUSNAVEUR 031133Z.

DISCUSSION:

a. The caveat that mission performance could preclude transmitting routine general service communications seems to have lulled all echelons into accepting non-receipt of position reports.

b. Such surveillance platforms must suspend technical operations when transmitting; therefore it is customary practice to select suitable operational opportunities to effect the transmission of outgoing traffic in least time. This, normally, does not affect the operations of the ship, especially in a peacetime environment.

13. (S) CINCUSNAVEUR advised** COMSIXTHFLT and the SIXTHFLT Service Force Commander on 3 June that USS LIBERTY would conduct extended, independent [REDACTED] operations in the Eastern Mediterranean pursuant to the schedule of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter alia, and indicated the requirement that logistic support be provided by those commanders. Pertinent instructions were to be provided USS LIBERTY by COMSIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

This message is consistent with their correct understanding that the affected commands had a support role only and not one extending to active control of USS LIBERTY's movements.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
**CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 031016Z June 67. (See Tab 25)

~~SECRET~~

14. (S) COMSIXTHFLT indicated his desire to visit the USS LIBERTY. However, previous instruction had been issued stating that association of the SIXTHFLT with the USS INTREPID should be avoided. Based on this precedent, the visit to the USS LIBERTY was not accomplished.

DISCUSSION:

When USS LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT, the latter wanted to board her to see what he could do for her and what she could do for him in other than ~~_____~~

15. (U) On 5 June, hostilities between Israel and the United Arab Republic broke out.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

16. (S) On 5 June CINCUSNAVEUR cancelled previous geographical guidance for employment of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 60) and instructed* that the Task Force ships and aircraft be operated no closer than 100 NM from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria, and United Arab Republic, and no closer than 25 NM from the coast of Cyprus. Other Task Forces to be addressed separately. It was explained that this was dictated by consideration which made it desirable to complicate the situation for the Russian warships moving into or in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as to improve the fleet's posture for tasks relating to the Israeli-United Arab Republic hostilities which might be imposed by higher authority. COMSIXTHFLT promulgated** orders to carry out the above to SIXTHFLT units that day (5 June).

* CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 051352Z June 67 (See Tab 26)
** COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 052015Z June 67 (See Tab 29)

11 31
5
DISCUSSION:

a. This directive accommodated COMSIXTHFLT desires to gain sea room to pursue necessary and routine training without, in any way, making it possible for such normal routine activity to be misinterpreted by the Middle East belligerents or by the Russians. The "bonus benefit" was as stated.

b. COMSIXTHFLT stated that this was the day he expected higher authority would have modified USS LIBERTY's orders in the interest of her safety; that had he had unequivocal operations control and concomittant understanding of USS LIBERTY's mission, he would have rendered such a judgment on 5 June. It was accepted that the mission was overriding. The logic was reinforced by:

(1) USS LIBERTY's ordered positioning was consistent with the requirements of mission as speculated.

(2) The fact of US neutrality and the operation of this unarmed naval vessel in international waters under such circumstances did not contribute to a feeling of apprehension.

(3) In the event evacuation or related other tasks were required of the SIXTHFLT, utilization of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(4) COMSIXTHFLT stated that had the USS LIBERTY been under his complete operations control, he too would have placed her where she was directed to operate in order to utilize her as envisioned in paragraph (3) above.


DISCUSSION:





a. This directive accommodated COMSIXTHFLT desires to gain sea room to pursue necessary and routine training without, in any way, making it possible for such normal routine activity to be misinterpreted by the Middle East belligerents or by the Russians. The "bonus benefit" was as stated.

b. COMSIXTHFLT stated that this was the day he expected higher authority would have modified USS LIBERTY's orders in the interest of her safety; that had he had unequivocal operations control and concomittant understanding of USS LIBERTY's mission, he would have rendered such a judgment on 5 June. It was accepted that the mission was overriding. The logic was reinforced by:

(1) USS LIBERTY's ordered positioning was consistent with the requirements of mission as speculated.

(2) The fact of US neutrality and the operation of this unarmed naval vessel in international waters under such circumstances did not contribute to a feeling of apprehension.

(3) In the event evacuation or related other tasks were required of the SIXTHFLT, utilization of the 

(4) COMSIXTHFLT stated that had the USS LIBERTY been under his complete operations control, he too would have placed her where she was directed to operate in order to utilize her as envisioned in paragraph (3) above.

~~SECRET~~

17. (7) On 6 June, CINCUSNAVEUR advised* COMSIXTHFLT that USS LIBERTY would be changed to his operational control at 0001Z, 7 June, "in order to facilitate area command and control" and satisfy any "requirement for protection." COMSIXTHFLT was instructed to operate USS LIBERTY in accordance with the schedule issued** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to derive maximum benefit from USS LIBERTY's [REDACTED] capabilities. Authorization was also granted to modify the above mentioned schedule for safety reasons as dictated by the local situation. In this multiple-addressee message, USS LIBERTY was directed to change to COMSIXTHFLT operational control at 0001Z, 7 June. USS LIBERTY was also informed that no position reports had been received since the 022400Z June report. USS LIBERTY was directed to submit future reports of position as of 1800Z and to raise precedence of the reports to IMMEDIATE, modifying the USCINCEUR address to internal indicator "for JRC."

DISCUSSION:

The above position report instruction changes were prompted by a request by USCINCEUR JRC, who notified CINCUSNAVEUR that USS LIBERTY situation and position reports were being considerably delayed due to competition with a large volume of other PRIORITY traffic. This change was designed to get these reports into the "quiet part of the radio day" and to make them less competitive with the large volume of high precedence traffic that all NAVCOMSTAS in the area were being deluged with.

*CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 061357Z June 67. (See Tab 30)
**JCS MSG 6724, DTG 011545Z June 67. (See Tab 18)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18. (S) At 2000Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY notified* the Movement Report Office, London, among others, that she would shift to the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at 0001Z, 7 June. At 2036Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY reported** for operational control to COMSIXTHFLT, effective at 0001Z, 7 June. Among other things, she also reported fuel state and endurance. USS LIBERTY also appraised COMSIXTHFLT that Condition of Readiness THREE modified had been assumed and that self-defense capability was "limited to four .50 caliber machine guns and small arms."

DISCUSSION:

The significant content of this routine administrative action by USS LIBERTY is the overt inclusion of the description of her self-defense capability. The Commanding Officer stated that this was premeditated response intended as a tactful, although obtuse, reminder of USS LIBERTY's movement into the Eastern Mediterranean and into the focus of hostilities which the new geographical restrictions on SIXTHFLT in the CINCUSNAVEUR message had high-lighted.

19. (S) On 6 June (about three hours after USS LIBERTY originated her reporting message and 29 hours prior to its receipt by COMSIXTHFLT) COMSIXTHFLT sent*** USS LIBERTY a message of instructions. This message referred to the Arab/Israeli situation and cited the unpredictability of United Arab Republic actions. It directed USS LIBERTY to conduct operations in accordance with the schedule provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR movement order and CINCUSNAVEUR sailing order. USS LIBERTY was directed to maintain a high state of

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062000Z June 67. (See Tab 33)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062036Z June 67. (See Tab 34)
***COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 062349Z June 67. (See Tab 36)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

vigilance against attack or threat of attack and to report "any threatening or suspicious actions directed against her or any diversion from schedule necessitated by external threat. Advise if local situation dictates change in area of operation assigned by reference JCS schedule." Contact report requirements were defined. USS LIBERTY was also instructed to copy Morocco teletype broadcast and to utilize TF 60 tactical circuits as required "...although not assigned to TF 60." USS LIBERTY was required to ACKNOWLEDGE. This message was never brought to the knowledge of the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

a. This message reflects a contradiction. Attention is invited to:

(1) The fact that it directs USS LIBERTY to copy the Morocco Fleet teletype broadcast;

(2) The fact that USS LIBERTY's original movement report advised* that she would shift to Asmara Fleet teletype broadcast at CHOP time (070001Z June).

b. USS LIBERTY did not receive the COMSIXTHFLT message. Consequently, USS LIBERTY did, in fact, shift to Asmara. However, there is no indication that this was a factor in the mis-handling errors in the communications of operational directives addressed to USS LIBERTY.

c. When USS LIBERTY failed to acknowledge this message, COMSIXTHFLT initiated tracer action through the ship-shore terminal to ascertain if it had been delivered. This was not completed prior to attack on USS LIBERTY, but did ascertain non-delivery for reasons cited in the section following, dealing with the flow of directives and analyses of the transmission modes.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021330Z June 67. (See Tab 23)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20. (f) About 0908Z, 7 June, USS LIBERTY situation/position report* as of 0800Z, 7 June, was sent by IMMEDIATE precedence. This was at 33-06N, 28-54E and indicated a PIM of 16.5 kts until 072300Z. Thence stationary within 30 NM of 31-45N, 33-30E. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at 080036Z (an interval of 15 hours and 28 minutes after being transmitted by USS LIBERTY).

DISCUSSION:

a. The various recipients received this as their first positive knowledge of USS LIBERTY's actual position. Subsequently, in this report it is shown that because of PRIORITY precedence previously used for these reports, those reports for 3, 4, 5, and 6 June had been backlogged and delayed in delivery and in two instances, erroneously filed without delivery.

b. This indicated that USS LIBERTY had speeded up over the Movement Report Speed of Advance indicated on departure Rota; rather, USS LIBERTY had proceeded "at best speed" to arrive Operations Area 3 "as soon as practicable." The missing position reports contained the movement report adjustments indicating this.

c. By the time various JRCs received this information, the USS LIBERTY was almost one day ahead of the schedule promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by mid-afternoon on 7 June, Washington time, was nearing a closest point of approach 100 NM from the United Arab Republic and Israeli coasts. (See chart 2, Annex E, Part IV)

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~_____~~

21. (S) On 7 June, ~~_____~~ requested* the Joint Chiefs of Staff to change USS LIBERTY's Operations area from area 3 (32N, 33 to 34E) to Operations Area 2 (32N, 31 to 33E) to satisfy technical requirements. No action resulted prior to attack on USS LIBERTY. (See chart 1, Annex E, Part IV)

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable other than to observe that this was overtaken by the attack on USS LIBERTY.

22. (S) About 2230Z, 7 June, the JCS/JRC notified** USCINCEUR (information to various addressees including Chief Naval Operations, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT and USS LIBERTY) that USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to United Arab Republic was changed to 20 NM and closest point of approach to Israel was changed to 15 NM. It also advised that "...in view present situation Eastern Mediterranean, operation area specified in JCS schedule for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate."

DISCUSSION:

a. This action was taken by message and it should be observed that it occurred only a short interval prior to a more significant JCS/JRC action sequence. It was consistent with established, approved routine and normal procedures set forth in SM 676-66*** and the JCS/JRC charter.

b. This change in USS LIBERTY's Schedule Track ~~_____~~ was prompted by a question raised by Chief Naval Operations concerning the prudence of sending USS LIBERTY to a position so close to the area of hostilities.

~~_____~~

**JCS MSG 7337, DTG 072230Z June 67. (See Tab 42)
***Enclosure to JCS 2150/214-2, dated 19 August 1966

~~SECRET~~

c. The words in the language quoted above from the JCS/JRC message represent a relaxation in the latitude for moving and positioning USS LIBERTY, but are so generally stated as to be the possible source of confusion. This latitude was not accompanied by a clarification of USS LIBERTY's mission, without which no commander could have exercised military judgment.

23. (S) About 072350Z June, and subsequent to discussions between representatives of JCS/JRC and Office of Chief Naval Operations, the Director, J-3, (OJCS) authorized Chief, JRC, to request USCINCEUR to apply the geographical restrictions of 100 NM closest point of approach to United Arab Republic and Israel, 25 NM closest point of approach to Cyprus, which were in effect on SIXTHFLT units, to USS LIBERTY. In view of the haste necessitated by USS LIBERTY's nearness to this geographical restriction, the JRC initiated a phone call to Headquarters, CINCUSNAVEUR.

DISCUSSION:

a. Early in the day Chief Naval Operations had raised a question concerning the ordered movement of USS LIBERTY. As a result of a query to JCS/JRC, he had been advised that technical reasons [REDACTED] were overriding. However, this did result in initiation of action to adjust the closest point of approach to 20 NM as indicated in the preceding fact. In view of the modified geographical restrictions of 100 NM on SIXTHFLT units and the inadequacy of the justification advanced by JCS/JRC, Chief Naval Operations again required his staff to press for modification of USS LIBERTY's movements, at least to conform to SIXTHFLT geographical restrictions.

~~SECRET~~

b. Of significance is the fact that at the time of the discussion referred to in the Fact Bearing, JCS/JRC representatives were not ware of the modified geographical restrictions which permitted SIXTHFLT units to operate to a 100 NM closest point of approach. The same message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Chief Naval Operations had been received as follows:

<u>CNO</u>	<u>JCS (JCS Msg Center)</u>	<u>Time Difference</u>
071548Z	071630Z	42 minutes

The analysis of communications in Annex D, Tab 8, treats this incident in more detail. However, it is a fact that this is one of several instances. All indicate that Navy message processing procedures generally result in earlier delivery of the same message to Navy addressees than do the procedures in effect to and through the NMCC message center for serving the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Note that this change of closest point of approach of USS LIBERTY to 100 NM occurred only about one hour after the 20 NM modification to USS LIBERTY's schedule.

24. (S) JCS/JRC Duty Officer placed the call via secure voice and contacted CINCUSNAVEUR Operation Duty Officer, who was requested to have USS LIBERTY comply with COMSIXTHFLT message, DTG 071530Z, which restricted SIXTHFLT units to remain beyond 100 NM of Israel and United Arab Republic coast and 25 NM from Cyprus. Brevity of time was explained as the reason for the call. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer advised that they would get the message right out to SIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

a. In CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters there are three co-located duty officers:

- ~~SECRET~~
- (1) CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain (O-6)
 - (2) CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer (O-5)
 - (3) CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer (O-3)

These watch personnel come under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff (O-6).

b. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer was the watch officer exercising cognizance over ~~_____~~
~~_____~~

c. Unlike the previous procedure, this action was contrary to customary usage in that it:

- (1) By-passed the USCINCEUR's JRC in going directly to the component headquarters.

- (2) Employed voice communications, vice record communications, to initiate an action.

- (3) Was initiating an action orally on a watch-to-watch basis rather than passing information of intent to do so at a future time, which seems to have been usual practice.

25. ~~(S)~~ The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer informed the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and drafted an appropriate message for dispatch to COMSIXTHFLT as follow-up action in accordance with verbal assurance given to the JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer contacted the CINCUSNAVEUR Deputy Chief of Staff, advising him of the JCS/JRC phone call and the proposed course of action. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that release be deferred pending receipt of an authoritative indication that the JCS/JRC action had been officially approved (i.e., in this case, a Date-Time-Group reference).

DISCUSSION:

a. The Headquarters, USNAVEUR, policy had been established that movement of ships and aircraft would be effected in response to oral communications from higher authority only if evidence of its official status were available. This was defined to mean:

(1) If transmitted by a flag/general officer;

(2) If evidence were provided that a record directive had, in fact, been approved AND released (such as an assigned message Date-Time-Group, cite number, etc.) and was beyond recall other than by official cancellation.

b. Staff personnel stated that use of a secure circuit nor use of an authenticator would have been an accepted substitute for this evidence of verification that the oral communications, from other than a flag/general officer, had been approved by an authority in the other headquarters.

26. (C) In response to the order of the Deputy Chief of Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR, the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer placed a call to USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact with the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer who was advised that the JCS/JRC had verbally requested USS LIBERTY be moved (as indicated above) and advised that the Date-Time-Group of the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was required before he could take action on the request. The USEUCOM Command Duty Officer said he would call back.

At about the same time, the JCS/JRC Duty Officer called USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact with the JRC watch officer, who was advised of the verbal request made to the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer. He explained that USCINCEUR had been by-passed in the interest of saving time; that CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "HAD promised to take action."

~~SECRET~~

Almost immediately the USEUCOM Duty Officer called USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer to advise of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer's request. On the basis of the JCS/JRC Duty Officer's call and his use of the word "had" in his message, both USEUCOM duty personnel assumed no further action was required.

DISCUSSION:

a. At USEUCOM headquarters the JRC is physically separated from the USEUCOM Command Center. These two facilities are in the same building but are on separate levels. There are the following key watch personnel:

(1) USEUCOM Command Duty Officer

(2) USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer

b. JCS/JRC Duty Officer employment of the word "had" in his conversation to USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer which informed him of action JCS/JRC assumed was in progress at CINCUSNAVEUR, based on the phone call contact with CINCUSNAVEUR's Operations Duty Officer, misled the USEUCOM Duty Officer into believing CINCUSNAVEUR had acted or would act. He took no further action.

27. ~~(S)~~ Approximately three hours passed without action or additional communications between CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters and USEUCOM headquarters on this matter. Subsequently, CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer (CCDO) called USEUCOM headquarters and this time was put in contact with USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer. NAVEUR CCDO asked what action was being taken by USEUCOM headquarters. USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer answered by asking the same question of the CINCUSNAVEUR CCDO, i.e., what action was being taken by CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. He was advised CINCUSNAVEUR action was being withheld pending

~~SECRET~~

a call back from USEUCOM in response to the earlier call (i.e., requesting Date-Time-Group of JCS/JRC message). It was suggested that the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer initiate a call to JCS/JRC requesting the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message or to provide an USEUCOM Date-Time-Group. The call terminated.

DISCUSSION:

Note carefully that unlike the initial call to USEUCOM, when the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer was reached, this call put CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer into contact with the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer,

28. (S) Prompt action was then taken by the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer in contacting the JCS/JRC Duty Officer to obtain the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message. The requested information was promptly relayed to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer. Coincident with this event (080325Z) the JCS/JRC message was placed in the hands of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer.

DISCUSSION:

a. The expedition with which this required action was accomplished by USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was, of course, coincident with the eventual availability of the Date-Time-Group at the NMCC message center. It is possible that the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer might have obtained the JCS/JRC message Date-Time-Group had he been contacted initially instead of the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer. In assessing the NMCC message center procedure, some skepticism exists.

b. The fact is evident, however, that USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer, being more experienced in such matters, had a better appreciation of the urgency connected with this, as well as more intimate knowledge of the standard procedure for quick reaction adjustments to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

c. It is probable that had JCS/JRC Duty Officer called USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer, necessary action would have been set in motion precluding this delay of about three hours.

29. (s) CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer directed a teletype conference with COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer be set up on secure teletype circuit. This was done by 0410Z and for the next thirty (30) minutes effort was made to pass the JCS/JRC message. Transmission difficulties resulting from atmospheric made this difficult and COMSIXTHFLT acknowledgement was not obtained until about 080455Z. CINCUSNAVEUR also sent a confirmation message* which COMSIXTHFLT received at 080518Z.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

30. (s) COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer prepared a message** to USS LIBERTY to carry out the JCS/JRC message directive. This was processed and ultimately ready for presentation to Assistant Chief of Staff (OPS) for release by 0630Z on 8 June. However, because of his preoccupation in activities with COMSIXTHFLT and his Chief of Staff in preparation for a Secretary of Defense directed press conference, the message was not released until 0913Z. The message, although assigned an IMMEDIATE precedence, was not transmitted to NAVCOMSTA Morocco for relay to USS LIBERTY until 1035Z 8 June because of delays incident to transmission of other equal or higher precedence messages. USS LIBERTY did not receive this message.

*CINCUSNAVEUR Wirenote, DTG 080455Z June 67. (See Tab 49)
**COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 080917Z June 67. (See Tab 53)

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION:

The Secretary of Defense had directed, in a message directly to COMSIXTHFLT, that press and media representatives be thoroughly briefed on SIXTHFLT operations as part of the effort in progress to refute United Arab Republic allegations that the SIXTHFLT was actively supporting Israel. The briefing was to be conducted forenoon, 8 June, on the USS AMERICA and COMSIXTHFLT and his key staff officer had been engaged in preparations since 0600 local time.

31. (S) The COMSIXTHFLT message to USS LIBERTY was received by NAVCOMSTA Morocco at 081050Z and delivered onward over Defense Communications System (DCS) to DCS Station Asmara (Army Communications Center, Asmara). DCS Station Asmara, through operator error, delivered the message onward to NAVCOMSTA Greece. NAVCOMSTA Greece sent it back, whereupon, it was delivered to NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 081510Z and placed on the teletype broadcast at 081525Z. USS LIBERTY's communications equipment had been destroyed in the meantime, during the attack.

DISCUSSION:

This is an over-simplified statement of the facts. The communications flow analysis (Annex D , Tab 6) highlights the situation existing at NAVCOMSTA Greece as a consequence of having to handle Foreign Broadcast ^{Information Service (editorial change)} Intercept System (FBIS) traffic. This is a non-military activity and it was dumping a high volume of high precedence traffic on NAVCOMSTA Greece, with an adverse impact on military communications.

32. (S) USS LIBERTY's 080800Z POSIT/SITREP report was the movement arrival report indicating 31-34N, 33-30E and that USS LIBERTY would remain within 30 NM of that point. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at 081120Z.

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

33. (P) USS LIBERTY reported*, by IMMEDIATE message, having been orbited by three DELTA Wing single-engine jet aircraft three times at 31-27N, 34-00E at 080650Z. These were not identified. Their altitude estimated to be 5,000 feet at two miles. USS LIBERTY stated that no amplifying report would be submitted. COMSIXTHFLT received this at 080920Z.

DISCUSSION:

COMSIXTHFLT was not alarmed by this because USS LIBERTY's indication of no further reports was taken to mean that the overflight was routine and was not indication of any apprehension by USS LIBERTY. It is to be noted that at least one other report of overflight of USS LIBERTY by an aircraft earlier in the Mediterranean transit had been made by USS LIBERTY.

34. (S) USS SARATOGA reported** at 081235Z that a FLASH message on the Navy High Command tactical voice circuit had been received from USS LIBERTY reporting, "I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33-25E, 31-23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE." It was determined that USS LIBERTY lost all antennas in this strafing attack.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 080742Z June 67. (See Tab 51)
**USS SARATOGA MSG, DTG 081235Z June 67. (See Tab 54)

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35. (~~C~~) At 081237Z, USS SARATOGA relayed a message* received from USS LIBERTY on CINCUSNAVEUR's Single Side Band circuit, reporting, "Unidentified gunboats approaching vessel now."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable; to fix time of event only.

36. (~~C~~) NAVCOMSTA Greece relayed a USS LIBERTY message** to COMSIXTHFLT reporting, "At 081253Z we have been hit by a torpedo starboard side, listing badly, request assistance immediately."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

*See Tab 55
**See Tab 58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDITIONAL
RELATED FACTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

(C) Organizationally, as provided for in JCS Pub 4, the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance assists the Director for Operations (J-3) in supervising worldwide reconnaissance activities. He is the principal agent assisting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising reconnaissance operational direction over the unified and specified commands. The Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), according to its charter, supports the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, and is operated continuously under a JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The JRC is not organizationally under the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

The NMCC is operated under a Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) who is continuously on duty. For this reason there are five DDOs and flag/general officer rank personnel who rotate on duty.

Neither the JRC nor the NMCC is subordinate to the other. Their interrelationship is not formally spelled out.

DISCUSSION:

- a. The JRC charter provides that it function under the authority and direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subject to the supervision and guidance of the Director, Joint Staff.
- b. Because of the sensitivity and classification associated with the reconnaissance operations which it is required to "supervise," "coordinate," "monitor," and in some instances "control" in actual practice, the JRC is autonomous in relation to the NMCC. The same applies to the JRC at Headquarters, USEUCOM.
- c. In both locations the JRCs are physically separate from the command centers.
- d. It is important to note that all queries by higher authority regarding military operations, including incidents,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

are directed to the DDO on duty within the NMCC, who in this case, had no knowledge of the operation of USS LIBERTY prior to the attack.

e. At Headquarters, USNAVEUR, the Operations Duty Officer is the Duty Officer having cognizance over reconnaissance operations. He is subordinate to the Command Center Duty Officer and the Duty Captain and is physically co-located within the Command Center.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

(U) Dictionary of Military Terms for Joint Usage defines the term OPERATIONAL CONTROL: "(See Operational Command) - (JCS): Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124). See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL; CONTROL."*

DISCUSSION:

While this term is used in assigning responsibility to a commander, in actual practice the direction of the platform's movements is controlled by another higher authority (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The commander's function, consequently, is not consistent with this definition and use of this term is a potential source of confusion and misunderstanding. It would seem that an early determination should be made either:

- (1) To amend the procedure to make the commander's responsibility complete with respect to what operational command is customarily accepted to mean; or

* JCS Pub 1, page 139.

(2) ~~Prescribe~~ a new term to clearly and unequivcally stipulate the lesser degree of responsibility, as apparently intended by current practices with respect to TRS and special operation ships only.

SECTION 2

SUPPORTING COMMUNICATIONS

SUBSECTION I
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS
WITH THE USS LIBERTY

1. (S) The means of communications available for the issuance and transmission of operations directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY from 1 through 8 June 1967 were a combination of Defense Communications System (DCS) and Navy voice and teletype dedicated networks. Of particular note was the interrelationships of transferring messages from the DCS relay stations to the appropriate NAVCOMMSTA dedicated networks.
2. (S) The USS LIBERTY departed Rota, Spain, on 2 June 1967, with the following communications arrangements:
 - a. Copy Morocco fleet teletype broadcast to receive general service communications until 7 June 1967, at which time, shift to Asmara Navy teletype broadcast.
 - b. Transmit to any shore Naval Communications Station to deliver any outgoing general service messages.
 - c. Copy Morocco [redacted] broadcast to obtain [redacted] traffic.
 - d. Transmit to Morocco to deliver outgoing [redacted] Traffic.
 - e. Set up direct teletype communications [redacted] when position [redacted] is favorable.
3. (S) There were eight key messages pertinent to the USS LIBERTY incident of which four message directives were originated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four messages by subordinate commanders, carrying out the JCS directives. These messages contained instructions regarding the assigned operating

location of the USS LIBERTY. The USS LIBERTY was an action or info addressee on all of these messages. The record of receipt of these messages is indicated in the following paragraphs. Detailed analysis outlined in the tabs deals only with key addressees. There were many other miscellaneous addressees on these messages.

4. (S) on 29 May 1967,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to assume operational control of the USS LIBERTY upon arrival at Rota, Spain. Subsequent messages between USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USS LIBERTY indicate this message was received and operational control was assumed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and ultimately by COMSIXTHFLT on 7 June 1967.

5. (S) On 1 June 1967,** the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to sail the USS LIBERTY on 2 June 1967 and established schedule and area of operation with a final position at 32°N, 33°E. This JCS directive also established closest points of approach to the United Arab Republic (UAR) of 13NM. The USS LIBERTY, in her 2 June 1967 position report*** indicated receipt of the JCS directive by stating her estimated arrival at the final destination (080300Z Jun 67).

6. (S) Due to hostilities between the UAR and Israel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 7 June 1967,**** directed USCINCEUR by priority message to change the USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to 20NM for the UAR and 15NM for Israel. Because it was mis sent to the Pacific by the Department of the Army Communications Center, this message was not received by the USS LIBERTY prior to attack.

REASON: Since a majority of US Navy Mobile Fleet messages are destined for the Pacific, local procedures in the Department of the Army Communications Center allow direct transmission to the communications center serving the task

* JCS msg 6499/291602Z May 67 (Tab 7, Annex C)
** JCS msg 6724/011545Z June 67 (Tab 18, Annex C)
*** USS LIBERTY msg 022108Z June 67 (Tab 24, Annex C)
**** JCS msg 7337/072230Z June 67 (Tab 42, Annex C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

force, by-passing the normal path through the relay at Cheltenham, Maryland. After preliminary review of the message and noting a task force addressee, the routing clerk in the Department of the Army Communications Center assigned the San Miguel, Philippines routing indicator on the assumption that the addressee was in the Pacific. Detailed explanation of routing and delay times is contained in Tab 1, Annex D.

7. (TS) By immediate message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 June 1967,* directed USCINCEUR to cancel previous JCS directive establishing 20 nautical mile limit and established 100 nautical mile limit. This message was not received by the USS LIBERTY.

REASON: A series of personnel errors resulting in misrouting the message to the Pacific area for the same reason as stated for previous message in paragraph 6. Subsequent retransmissions were required which delayed the ultimate broadcast (after the attack) to the USS LIBERTY. Tab 2, Annex D, provides complete details of delay times and misrouting data.

8. (S) While the previous paragraphs have dealt with the delivery of JCS message directives to the USS LIBERTY, the following paragraphs will outline subordinate command directives concerning USS LIBERTY operation.

9. (S) On 6 June 1967, ** CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume operational control of USS LIBERTY at 070001Z June 1967 and further stated that operational area might be modified, for safety reasons, as dictated by the local conditions. This directive also requested that position reports be changed to "as of 1800Z" and upgraded to immediate precedence. The USS LIBERTY was instructed to "Chop" to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z.

* JCS msg 73477080110Z June 67 (Tab 45, Annex C)
** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 061357Z June 67 (Tab 30, Annex C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There is evidence that substantiates the receipt of this message by the USS LIBERTY in her message, also on 6 June 1967,* as she reported to COMSIXTHFLT acknowledging the change of operational control as of 070001Z.

10. (S) The COMSIXTHFLT message on 6 June 1967,** instructed USS LIBERTY to change operational control to COMSIXTHFLT and provided instructions regarding threats of attack, logistical requirements, contact reports with unidentified or hostile ships/aircraft, and emergency action procedures. Specific instructions regarding communications procedures were also given. This message was probably undelivered to the USS LIBERTY since she shifted to the Asmara broadcast on 7 June 1967 as originally scheduled by her 2 June 1967 movement report (see Tab 24, Annex C).

11. (S) USCINCEUR message on 8 June 1967,*** directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take for action the JCS directive changing the closest points of approach to UAR and Israel to 100 nautical miles. Prior to dispatch of this message, various efforts had been made by telecon, voice and teletype, to pass the action and a copy of the JCS message directive to COMSIXTHFLT. This action was completed approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes prior to dispatch of USCINCEUR message. See Tabs 3 and 4, Annex D for analysis. Since direct circuits were used, the USS LIBERTY was not included in any of the telecon transmissions between CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT. The USS LIBERTY was an addressee on the USCINCEUR directive which was placed on the Asmara fleet broadcast at 081059Z. Since records were not available from the USS LIBERTY, receipt of the USCINCEUR message could not be confirmed. It should be noted, however, that this directive

* USS LIBERTY msg 062036Z June 67 (Tab 34, Annex C)
** COMSIXTHFLT msg 062349Z June 67 (Tab 36, Annex C)
*** USCINCEUR msg 080625Z June 67 (Tab 49, Annex C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

made no mention of new geographical constraints, but only stated "This confirms reference a (telecon between USCINCEUR) to take reference b (JCS directive which was missent to the Pacific and not received by the USS LIBERTY) for action."

12. (S) The final directive to be discussed is the COMSIXTHFLT instructions* establishing a new closest point of approach of 100 nautical miles to the UAR and Israel. The directive was in response to CINCUSNAVEUR action outlined in a message** relayed via telecon. After internal staffing and delay in preparation and transmission due to equal or higher precedence traffic, the COMSIXTHFLT message was broadcast to and received by NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco, approximately one and one-half hours prior to the attack on the USS LIBERTY. The NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco relayed via the DCS Major Relay at San Pablo, Spain, to DCS Major Relay (Army Communications Center) Asmara. Due to a personnel error, resulting in sending the message to NAVCOMMSTA, Greece, which sent it back for delivery to NAVCOMMSTA, Asmara, the message was not placed on the fleet broadcast until 081525Z, some three hours after the attack. It is apparent that the USS LIBERTY did not receive the message. (See Tab 5, Annex D)

13. (S) The following paragraphs are designed to provide a basis for assessing the USS LIBERTY communications capability.

14. (S) During the transit of the USS LIBERTY to its designated position, a quality communications product was being obtained, and criticom special circuits to the communication shore station (Morocco) were good. The USS LIBERTY shifted from the Morocco broadcast to the Asmara broadcast at 070001Z in accordance with information given in USS LIBERTY movement report, DTG 021330Z.

* COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 67 (Tab 53, Annex C)

** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 080455Z June 67 (Tab 48, Annex C)

In the Eastern Mediterranean some ships desire to use Asmara broadcast which has fewer customers, may provide better service, and may be more responsive to rerun requests. This is a doubtful procedure because Naval Communication Stations Morocco and Greece offer a larger choice of frequencies, are simultaneously keyed, and cover a larger area of the Mediterranean, thus requiring fewer shifts of broadcasts. The crew aboard the USS LIBERTY verified the excellent quality of communications prior to the attack. Further attesting to this is the fact that only 14 out of approximately 1000 messages required a rerun on 6 June 1967. Of these 14, only six were applicable to the USS LIBERTY. Of the six, three had previously been obtained, which indicates some lack of good record keeping.

15. [REDACTED]

16. [REDACTED]

17. (✓) Although the attack resulted in a complete loss of communications, emergency restoration of HICOM voice capability was completed within minutes of the attack. All USS LIBERTY communications immediately after the attack were via HICOM voice network.

SUBSECTION II

STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

1. (S) Prior to and concurrent with the hostilities between the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Israel, traffic volume in the Mediterranean area communications stations almost doubled during the week prior to the USS LIBERTY incident. Naval Communication Station (NAVCOMMSTA) Greece particularly was loaded with large amounts of Flash and Immediate traffic. A special channel for Flash and Immediate message traffic to State Department Athens was set up from NAVCOMMSTA, Greece and soon became backlogged. During the period 5 - 10 June 1967 inclusive, records of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center indicated that 610 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) messages were received. Of these, 317 were Operational Immediate and 15 were Flash, or 54% of the total 610. (See Tab 5, Annex D, for comparative analysis of message volume for 1 - 12 February and 1 - 12 June.)

2. (S) The overall increased volume of high precedence message traffic, Operational Immediate and Flash, had a direct bearing on the ability to transmit instructions to the USS LIBERTY. Specifically, the COMSIXTHFLT Communications Center had seven Operational Immediate and one Flash message which were in station at the time of release of COMSIXTHFLT message 080917Z to the USS LIBERTY regarding new constraints on geographical limits of operation. Other communications centers at other locations had the same situation existing. Directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the delay in delivery of the 7 June USS LIBERTY position report was due to high precedence communications. For this same reason

~~SECRET~~

position reports for 3, 4 and 5 June were also delayed. Due to long delays or non-receipt of position reports, it was assumed by all echelons that the USS LIBERTY was on schedule and proceeding to on-station location, while in actuality, the ship was on station nearly one day in advance of initially established arrival time.

3. (S) Originators of messages destined for the European area raised the precedence of their traffic to improve delivery time. Many high precedence messages contained large numbers of addressees, thereby delaying rapid delivery. Some operation orders sent by electrical means were very lengthy (i.e., 19AF Seymour Johnson AF Base 00349/301730Z May, 28 pages, 83 addressees; and CINCAFSTRIKE 88847/280051Z May, 46 pages, 81 addressees). Very lengthy messages tend to clog communication circuits causing backlogs of equal and lower precedence traffic. The principles of communication economy demand that originators use the lowest precedence permissible, have as few addressees as are necessary, and be brief and concise. Application of these principles help preserve the integrity of communication networks, permits more rapid delivery of all traffic and reduces possible backlog delays; however, in this Middle East situation, these principles were widely violated.

4. (S) At 051200Z June USCINCEUR imposed "Minimize" on originators of teletypewriter messages within European Theater, but did not request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further impose "Minimize" on messages into the theater. This message was transmitted about the same time CINCUSNAVEUR requested "Minimize" be imposed. In an attempt to overcome backlogs, communication personnel stood extra watches (watch off and watch on in some cases) and ordered additional communication channels where possible.

~~SECRET~~

5. (S) As a separate but related item, a NATO emergency action message exercise was conducted in the midst of the period subsequent to the attack on the USS LIBERTY when there was extensive high precedence message traffic and when "Minimize" had already been imposed to reduce abnormal amount of traffic. These high precedence exercise messages interfered with actual high precedence traffic associated with the attack on the USS LIBERTY. Additionally, this incident is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of communications facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over whom the US military commander cannot exercise control. (See Tab 6, Annex D, for NATO Wide Awake 9-67 Information.)

6. (S) As a consequence of this JCS Fact Finding Team, procedural disparities between commands and communications center activities became apparent.

a. The application of date time groups is accomplished in several different methods, with no direct meaningful correlation. For example, one command assigns the DTG as it is received at the message center. Another command assigns the DTG at the time it is released, while still another assigns the DTG just prior to preparation for transmission.

b. The procedures for processing outgoing messages by the NMCC message center, Pentagon, are unnecessarily delaying JCS traffic. The requirement to administratively process outgoing messages prior to receipt and transmission by the Department of the Army Communications Center is questioned.

c. The present methods of assignment of routing indicators for the addressees does not minimize personnel errors. In the case of communications to the USS LIBERTY, personnel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

error in routing indicator assignment was a major factor causing untimely delivery of critical messages. Further discussion and specific cases are provided in Subsection I of this Annex.

d. The difference in procedures for transmission and delivery of messages from the originator to the primary action agency has been highlighted during this study. In one instance, two command centers located in the same building but served by different communications centers, were addressees on a specific Flash message. However, one command center received the message approximately one hour before the other command center was aware of its existence. (See Tabs 7 and 8, Annex D, for specific examples.)

e. Personnel manning of the communications centers contacted by the team is below established authorized strength. Verification of need for additional personnel was evidenced by the necessity for augmenting shifts and compressing schedules which have been in existence, in one instance, for the past fourteen months. In addition, individuals performing such functions as routing indicator assignments, tape preparation and torn tape relay are, for the most, inexperienced individuals with minimum time in service (one to two years). This factor contributes to personnel errors introduced into the preparation and transmission of messages. Supervisory officer personnel are very junior and rarely have in excess of one or two years length of service; yet they are in positions where exercise of judgment could be a key factor in selecting the order in which important messages of the same precedence should be sent.

7. (c) The practice aboard technical research ships (TRS) (USS LIBERTY) of combining general service and [REDACTED] in a single package causes delay

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in processing of general service traffic. In each of these cases, the general service traffic has to be segregated and separate messages created for the general service portion. While the mission and employment of the TRS probably justifies this practice, the procedure should be defined as a standard so that operational control authorities can treat it on the basis of exception to the ordinary route.

8. (S) It was the expressed opinion at USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR that the Defense Communications Systems (DCS) performs satisfactorily during normal peacetime periods but was not responsive in crisis periods. The lack of flexibility in routing of communications traffic and ability to augment, on a contingency basis, was cited as particular deficiencies.

9. (S) The CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT expressed the inability of the DCS to react to all needs and emphasized that dedicated circuitry would always be a requirement if effective command and control is to be accomplished. COMSIXTHFLT amplified this desire by stating "he would trade one ship for effective communications," emphasizing his dissatisfaction with current capabilities of equipment and facilities.

10. (S) The Deputy, USCINCEUR, stated that communications at Stuttgart, Germany, despite the mobile configuration currently being employed, are far superior to those previously provided at Camp Des Loges, France.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBSECTION III

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS ITEMS

1. (S) The increased volume of traffic during the Middle East crisis highlighted the need to augment the Defense Communications System (DCS) on a contingency basis, to support unforeseen trouble areas. This augmentation should not necessarily be in terms of hardware but also in terms of:
 - a. Calling up additional leased circuits.
 - b. Circuit rearrangements.
 - c. Manpower pools.
 - d. Elimination of relays by establishing direct circuits between points of high traffic volume.
2. (S) The impact of introducing into the DCS a volume of high precedence traffic, from a National Communications System (NCS) Operating Agency (i.e. State Department) during a crisis period, degrades the already overloaded DCS. This saturation emphasized the lack of prior consideration to handle the NCS and other (NATO) agency traffic over DCS facilities.
3. (S) The introduction of NATO exercise traffic into the DCS during crisis periods, such as occurred on 8 June 1967 is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over whom the US military commander cannot exercise control.
4. (S) From an analysis of communications, the need for traffic management of communications was apparent. Institution of re-routing around trouble areas or making maximum use of direct circuits are means to alleviate pressure points which result in times of crisis.
5. (S) As a result of the JCS Fact Finding Team examination regarding the USS LIBERTY, numerous procedural deficiencies were revealed:
 - a. Assignment of improper precedence and excessive number of addressees was observed.

b. Procedure for assignment of date time group is not consistent within or between command/services.

c. The methods of and procedures for assignment of routing indicators exposes a means for personnel error. The use of such advancements as automatic scanners and application of Automatic Data Processing would eliminate personnel error, reduce manpower requirements, improve quality of transmission and reduce message handling times.

d. As evidenced by a specific message directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the methods of transmitting a message from an originator to two addressees in the same location (Pentagon) are different, resulting in one addressee receiving the message in advance of other addressees which require an additional relay point. For efficiency and operational expediency, messages should flow to the addressees in the most direct route.

PART III

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. (S) The interrelationship between the Deputy Director for Operations, as senior watch officer within the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) be formalized.

2. (S) The term "Operational Control" not be used in assigning responsibility to a commander of a unified and specified command or subordinate command for [REDACTED] ship [REDACTED] operations when, in fact, his responsibility is not intended to be fully consonant with that term as defined in JCS Publication No. 1. If a new descriptive term is required, it should be promulgated.

3. (S) The current policy guidance whereby [REDACTED] requirements are validated and approved be continued.

4. (S) The procedures governing the control of [REDACTED] platforms be made more definitive with respect to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] platforms, and be disseminated to insure:

a. Commanders of unified and specified commands, as well as major component commanders, have a clearer and mutual understanding of the relative importance of [REDACTED] activities within their respective areas of responsibilities.

b. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

c. Artificial "barriers" between operational elements of staffs and the [REDACTED] staff elements which apparently have emerged [REDACTED] be specifically reviewed and eliminated in order to improve the value and timely utilization of the [REDACTED] at all major command echelons.

5. (S) The present JCS/JRC charter and policy guidance defined in ~~SM~~ 676-66, dated 19 August 1966, be continued as an effective modus operandi for the rapid reaction control of the [REDACTED] but that JCS/JRC adhere to the established procedures whereby JRC must deal with JRCs in the established chain.

6. (S) The necessary clarification of the authority delegated JRC duty personnel to issue oral directives in the name of the commander concerned be issued within and to all affected commands as soon as possible, establishing a system of authentications, if necessary, to achieve quick reaction capability.

7. (S) There should be no independent operations in a commander's area without his being informed and his responsibility clearly defined.

8. (S) All echelons appreciate that ships of LIBERTY class are defenseless, and that it is impossible for an operational commander to protect it adequately without negating its usefulness; i.e., without providing escort and combat air patrol (CAP) he can only react to attack once initiated or threatened, which in this case was too late.

9. (S) A specific exception and procedure be spelled out for [REDACTED] platforms, the nature of whose missions preclude adhering to standard movement reporting.

10. (U) The exploitation of available technology be accelerated to modernize message handling and routing procedures to minimize impact of relative scarcity of qualified career personnel in the current and expanding environment of extremely rapid and high volume communications.

11. (U) The need for dedicated command and control circuitry, as opposed to use of common user circuitry, be carefully reevaluated in view of this incident.

12. (U) As a matter of urgency, the Department of Defense Communications Satellite program be accelerated to achieve shipboard terminals as soon as practicable in order to improve the capability of fleet control communications.

13. (U) Possible undesirability of amalgamating NATO-US military communications and communications satellite programs be carefully reviewed.

14. (U) The impact on the Defense Communications System (DCS) by National Communications System (NCS) communications should be carefully surveyed in light of the impact of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Department of State traffic on the military DCS communications stations in this crisis situation.

15. (U) The Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) study the procedures used to find and apply the correct routing indicators for addressees of messages with the object of finding a modern method which will minimize personnel errors.

16. (U) The impact of the DCS function on a communications station should be reviewed, with respect to the manning and experience levels of the communications station; that the personnel allowances and requirements of communications stations be reexamined.

17. (U) The Defense Communications Agency establish a traffic management capability, as opposed to circuit management, in order to provide for dispatching the flow of traffic through unburdened DCS paths to effect prompt relief of congestion during contingencies.

PART IV

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

MJCS-271-07
15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH R. RUSS, USA, 019860,
CHIEF, JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
GROUP, OJCS

Subject: Fact-Finding Team (U)

1. (S) You are herewith designated senior member of an ad hoc fact-finding team to examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operational directives to the USS LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 6 June 1967 which culminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY (GTR 3) on 081210Z June 1967.

2. (U) The team shall comprise the following members whose security clearances are as indicated:

Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA, 019860, TS/SI
Rear Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, USN, 082418, TS/SI
Colonel William A. Garrett, USAF, FR 10858, TS/SI
Captain William D. Owen, USN, 107068, TS/SI
Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF, FR 47157, TS/SI

You are also to request the Military Services to designate a point of contact to facilitate your obtaining such assistance from the Services as you may require.

3. (S) Your fact-finding study shall include:

a. The means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY.

b. The specific orders:

(1) Issued to the USS LIBERTY between 1 June and 8 June 1967.

copy 1 of 10 copies each
of 2 pages series. 62

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 5 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

(2) To which USS LIBERTY responded during those same periods.


c. Circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in the receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their nonreceipt.

4. (U) You will incorporate in your report any official US public statements which bear on your findings.

5. (U) You are directed to report your findings together with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. (U) The court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR to inquire into the circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack on the USS LIBERTY will inquire into administrative, disciplinary, and internal matters within that command which are not within the scope of the examination by the fact-finding team. This fact-finding team will not infringe upon the prerogatives of the court of inquiry.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



B. E. SPIVY
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Copy to:

USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMDR 6TH FLEET
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B

ITINERARY

ITINERARY

DEPARTED	Washington, D. C.	2020	12 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	0815	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1655	13 June 1967
ARRIVED	Stuttgart, Germany	1910	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	Stuttgart, Germany	1400	14 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1935	14 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens, Greece	0805	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1000	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1015	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1025	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1235	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1240	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1243	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1440	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens, Greece	1445	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Malta	1815	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Malta	0700	16 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	1330	16 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1330	18 June 1967
ARRIVED	Washington, D. C.	1645	18 June 1967

ROSTER OF PERSONS VISITED (cont'd)

CINCUSNAVEUR

NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
John S. McCain, Jr. ADM, USN	CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
J. C. WYLIE, Jr. RADM, USN	Deputy, CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
M. J. HANLEY, Jr. CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff	13 June 1967
W. N. HATCH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence	13 June 1967
E. E. LEE CDR, USN	Admin Officer/Head, Plans Policy	13 June 1967
R. D. SMITH CAPT, USN	Head, ISIC	13 June 1967
E. L. GOLAVOTTI LT, USN	Asst Ship Operations	13 June 1967
R. F. ROEMER CDE, USN	Asst for Carrier & Special Wpns Ops	13 June 1967
C. A. TURNER CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Logistics	13 June 1967
L. R. RAISH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Communications	13 June 1967

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

G. D. JORGENSEN
CDR, USN

Command Center Duty Officer 13 June 1967

COMSIXTHFLT

W. I. MARTIN VADM, USN	COMSIXTHFLT	15 June 1967
C. H. SMITH CAPT, USN	Chief of Staff	15 June 1967
R. I. KASTEN CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	15 June 1967

CINCUSNAVEUR
(Board of Inquiry)

I. C. KIDD RADM, USN	Chairman	15 June 1967
B. M. ATKINSON CAPT, USN	Member	15 June 1967

ANNEX C

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES



EFFECTING

LIBERTY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
1. 052235Z NOV	JCS (5838)	TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, INFO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS, OPS CONTROL OF TRS W/B EFFECTED THRU COMPONENT COMMANDS.
2. 241212Z FEB	USCINCEUR	DIRECTED COMPONENTS TO CLEAR ALL ITEMS REQUIRING DECISION WITH USEUCOM.
[REDACTED]		
4. 240020Z MAY	COMSERVRON 8	DIRECTED LIBERTY TO DEPART ABIDJAN ASAP FOR ROTA.
5. 241732Z MAY	LIBERTY	TO ALCON GIVING ETA ROTA AT 312000Z MAY AND ETA OP AREA OFF PORT SAID 061400Z (FIRST INDICATION COMSIXTHFLT HAD THAT LIBERTY TO BE STATIONED OFF EGYPT).
6. 271052Z MAY	CINCUSNAVEUR	OUTLINE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF OPS AND DEFINED 100 NM CPA UAR LIMITATION.
7. 291602Z MAY	JCS (6499)	TO CINCLANT AND USCINCEUR APPROVING DIVERSION OF LIBERTY TO EAST MED. INFO LIBERTY.
[REDACTED]		
9. 300040Z MAY	CINCLANTFLT	SERVLANT AND OTHERS - DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP TO USCINCEUR UPON ARRIVAL ROTA. INFO LIBERTY.
10. 300202Z MAY	COMSERVRON 8	DIRECTS LIBERTY TO CHOP TO USCINCEUR.
11. 300932Z MAY	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR INFORMING OF RESPONSE FOR ASSUMING OP CONTROL OF LIBERTY UPON ARRIVAL AT ROTA.
12. 310828Z MAY	LIBERTY	PIM REPORT

	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
13.	311750Z MAY	CINCUSNAVEUR	DIRECTS LIBERTY, UPON CHOP TO USNAVEUR DEPART ROTA FOR EAST MED.
14.	010035Z JUN	USCINCEUR	REQUESTS JCS GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO SKED, OP AREA, AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS. INFORMS USNAVEUR THAT SKED AND OP AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED. DIRECTS SITREPS AND PIM REPTS.
15.	010309Z JUN	JCS (6714)	TO USCINCEUR - HOLD LIBERTY AT ROTA UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED. PUBS AND ██████████ TO BOARD AT ROTA. INFO LIBERTY.
16.	010419Z JUN	USCINCEUR	TELLS USNAVEUR TO TAKE JCS MSG 010309Z JUNE FORAC.
17.	011305Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO LIBERTY - DIRECTED LIBERTY TO DELAY SAILING UNTIL AFTER PUBS AND ██████████ ABOARD.
18.	011545Z JUN	JCS (6724)	TO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS, INCLUDING LIBERTY, DIRECTED LIBERTY BE SAILED TO EAST MED ARRIVING OFF PORT SAID ON 8 JUN.
19.	012030Z JUN	USCINCEUR	DIRECTS USNAVEUR TO TAKE FORAC JCS MSG 011545Z JUN. INFO LIBERTY.
20.	012120Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	HOLDS LIBERTY UNTIL REPAIRS COMPLETED.
21.	020717 JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	LIBERTY - DIRECTED TO PROCEED ON 2 JUN IAW JCS MSG 011545Z JUN.
22.	021132Z JUN	LIBERTY	REPAIRED AT 021230Z DEPARTED AT THAT TIME AT BEST SPEED.
23.	021330Z JUN	LIBERTY	USNAVEUR AND OTHERS - MOVEMENT REPORT SHOWING ETA 080300Z AT 32N and 33-30E.
24.	022108Z JUN	LIBERTY	ALCON - DEPARTED ROTA.
25.	031016Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT THAT LIBERTY WOULD BE CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OPS IN EAST MED AND REQUESTED LOG SUPPORT. INFO LIBERTY.
26.	051352Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT - CPA OF 100 NM TO UAR AND OTHERS.

	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
27.	051850Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT, AIR AND SURFACE OPS CPA 25 NM FROM CYPRUS IS AUTHORIZED.
28.	051934Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO ALCON - ADVISED OF 2400 POSITION OF 35-20N and 19-10E AND ADVISED SHE HAD ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE.
29.	052015Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO CTF 60 - CPA OF 100 NM TO UAR AND OTHERS.
30.	061357Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT, DIRECTING OP COM OF LIBERTY AT 070001Z.
31.	061410Z JUN	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR, INFO LIBERTY ET AL, REQ SITREPS AND PIMS AS-OF 1800Z "O" PRECEDENCE.
32.	061844Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO ALCON - POSITION REPORT OF LIBERTY.
33.	062000Z JUN	LIBERTY	CHOP REPORT.
34.	062036Z JUN	LIBERTY	ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT OF STATICS AND ACKNOWLEDGED OPCON CHANGE SCHEDULED FOR 070001Z.
35.	062050Z JUN	JCS (7206)	OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING SCHEDULE FOR LIBERTY WHILE IN USCINCEUR AREA.
36.	062349Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO LIBERTY OUTLINING OPCON GUIDANCE.
37.	070259Z JUN	JCS (7239)	TO COMSIXTHFLT - CJCS REQUESTED VERIFICATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO COMM OR CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ISRAEL.
38.	070626Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	CONFIRMED TO THE JCS AND OTHERS THAT VOICE CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND TEL AVIV HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. ALSO STATED NO COMM WITH ISRAELI FORCE EXISTED.
39.	070908Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION REPORT AS OF 070800Z AND ETA AT 31-45N and 33-30E at 072300Z.
40.	071503Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	ADVISED JCS AND OTHERS OF AIR OPS OF 5-6 JUN AND ALSO ADVISED OF 100 NM CPA FOR AIR AND SURFACE OPS.



	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
42.	072230Z JUN	JCS (7337)	CHANGED CPA TO 20 NM AND GAVE OPTION TO MODIFY ORIG TASKING (011545Z) AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE. INFO LIBERTY.
43.	072350Z JUN	JCS(JRC)- TELECON	TO USNAVEUR, ADVISING THAT CPA OF LIBERTY WAS BEING CHANGED TO 100 NM. MSG TO FOLLOW.
44.	080030Z JUN	JCS(JRC)- TELECON	TO USCINCEUR ADVISING OF CALL TO USNAVEUR AND SAME INFO AS GIVEN TO USNAVEUR.
45.	080110Z JUN	JCS (7347)	CONFIRMED 100 NM CPA AS RELAYED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.
46.	080325Z JUN	USNAVEUR - TELECON	TO USCINCEUR REQUESTING DTG OF JCS MSG. USCINCEUR OBTAINED AND RELAYED TO USNAVEUR.
47.	080410Z JUN	USNAVEUR - TELECON	TO COMSIXTHFLT, AUTHORIZED TEXT OF JCS 080110Z AND REQUESTING TAKE FORAC. OFFICIAL MSG TO FOLLOW. (TRANSACTION COMPLETED AT 080455Z).
48.	080455Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT CONFIRM TELECON BY WIRENOTE.
49.	080625Z JUN	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR, OFFICIALLY CONFIRMING 080410Z ACTION COMPLETED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.
50.	080634Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION AS 31-45N and 33-30E WITHIN 30 NM FOR NEXT 24 HOURS.
51.	080742Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO ALCON - ADVISED OF BEING ORBITED BY TWO JET AIRCRAFT.
52.	080856Z JUN	LIBERTY	DESTROYING SUPERSEDED MATERIAL DUE TO CURRENT SITUATION AND SHALLOW WATER.
53.	080917Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO LIBERTY - DIRECTED NEW CPA OF 100 NM. REQUESTED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. (NOT RECEIVED PRIOR TO ATTACK).
54.	081235Z JUN	LIBERTY	RELAYED BY USS SARATOGA. ADVISED OF ATTACK.
55.	081237Z JUN	SARATOGA	LIBERTY'S REPORT OF THREE MTBS APPROACHING.

	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
56.	081250Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	DIRECTS AMERICA TO LAUNCH A/C TO ASSIST LIBERTY.
57.	081254Z JUN	LIBERTY	RELAYED BY SARATOGA, ADVISING OF TORPEDO ATTACK.
58.	081301Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA GREECE	TO USNAVEUR - RELAYED INFO RECEIVED FROM LIBERTY VIA VOICE HICOM THAT TORPEDO HIT ON STARBOARD. OCCURRED AT 081253Z.
59.	081316Z JUN	CTF 60	DIRECTS BOTH AMERICA AND SARATOGA TO LAUNCH FOUR A/C IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY. REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.
60.	081320Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR AND AIG 998 - CONFIRMED LIBERTY ATTACK. INDICATED A/C BEING DEPLOYED.
61.	081339Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	CNO INFORMED OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. FACT THAT LIBERTY POSIT ON EDGE OF UAR CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND PILOTS ARE TO DEFEND LIBERTY, NOT TO PENETRATE CLAIMED LIMIT. DESTRUCTIVE FORCE BY A/C AUTHORIZED.
62.	081340Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO LIBERTY - REQUEST CONFIRMATION AND ADVISED TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH ANY STATION.
63.	081410Z JUN	CTF 63	RECOMMENDS PAPAGO BE DIRECTED TO ASSIST.
64.	081412Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO	LIBERTY REPORTED UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKERS, HELOS CIRCLE SHIP AFTER ATTACK, POSSIBLY ISRAELI.
65.	081414Z JUN	USDAO TEL AVIV	REPORTED TO WHITE HOUSE AND OTHERS INCLUDING COMSIXTHFLT, THAT ATTACK WAS A MISTAKE.
66.	081416Z JUN	JCS (7354)	AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND LIBERTY AGAINST FURTHER ATTACK.
67.	081417Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	RELAY THE 081339Z (081349Z) MSG TO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS.
68.	081425Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR INFORMED OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS.

	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
69.	081430Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INSTRUCTS VP A/C TO REMAIN 100 NM FROM COAST AND BORDER OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT.
70.	081439Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	FIRST SITREP FOUR DEAD EXCESS OF 50 WOUNDED ON LIBERTY.
71.	081455Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	LIBERTY UNDERWAY AT 8 KTS COURSE 340°M.
72.	081514Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMS ALL HIGHER AUTHORITY ONLY COMM WITH LIBERTY VIA HICOM NET.
73.	081517Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	INFORMS COMSIXTHFLT THAT ONLY NEWS RELEASES WILL BE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.
74.	081521Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMED USCINCEUR AND OTHERS THAT TEL AVIV HAS RECEIVED REPORT THAT ISRAEL A/C AND MTBS HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED THE LIBERTY AT 081200Z.
75.	081529Z JUN	JCS (7369)	USE OF FORCE WITHDRAWN.
76.	081609Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USE OF FORCE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED.
77.	081649Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	ALL A/C RECALLED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE


FROM: JCS

DATE: 06 NOV 65 INFO:

DISTRIBUTION

TO: CINCPAC
CINCLANT

INFO: CNO
USCINCEUR ✓
CINCSOUTH
CINCSTRIKE
CINCPACFLT
CINCLANTFLT



~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 5338. J-3 SENDS.

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR TRS OPERATIONS (U)

REFS:

B. CNO MEMO OP-922YE/RH-00030P92, 27 OCT (NOTAL)


1. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ SUGGESTED GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED BY THE REFERENCES
FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS.

THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE
REF AND IS ISSUED FOR USE IN GENERAL PLANNING FOR

SIGINT SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS WHEN REQUIRED:

A. DESCRIPTION. SPECIAL MODIFIED FORMER
MERCHANT SHIPS CONFIGURED TO CARRY OUT THEIR
MISSION.

B. MISSION.



DRAFTER
THW/QJ

RELEASING OFFICER GP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,

RELEASED AT (2020)

DOCUMENT MARKING

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 4

REFS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO 25
AGI
DTG
SUSPENSE 28

~~TOP SECRET~~

AGI NR. 70183

AGO NR.

DTG 052235Z

ENTIRE MSG

[REDACTED]

(2) CLASSIFICATION OF DETAILS OF SPECIFIC NATURE OF MISSION: REQUIRES HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE [REDACTED]

(3) DIVERSION FROM MISSION. THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR [REDACTED] PURPOSE ONLY. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE MADE ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY, IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF JCS PUB 2 (UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES), PARAGRAPHS 30229 AND 30248 APPLY.

C. [REDACTED] THE MISSION OF THE TRS IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.

D. CONTROL OF TRS.

MSTS?

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SHIP. MILITARY

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE SHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE COGNIZANT UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER THROUGH THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO A SPECIFIC FLEET OF FORCE COMMANDER.

QUALIFIER

RELEASING OFFICER

GP-3

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS.

DOCUMENT MARKING

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 OF 4

TYPER TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR. 70183

- AGO
- AGI
- DTG
- SUSPENSE

AGO NR.

DTG

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PING 83
O 240020Z MAY 67
FM COMSERVON EIGHT
TO RUEBPA/USC LIBERTY
INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

[REDACTED]

RUDLKA/CINCSNAVEUR
RUTKCA/COMSIATHEAT

[REDACTED]

RJT KC/NAVSTA ROTA
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY 231500Z APR 67
NOVEMBER CHANGE

1. CANCEL PARAS 1 AND 2 REFERENCE A.
2. MAKE IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS TO GET UNDERWAY. WHEN RFS ASAP DEPART ABIDJAN AND PROCEED BEST POSS SOA TO ROTA SPAIN TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PLNS. WHEN RFS PROCEED TO OP AREA OFF PORT SAID. SPECIFIC AREAS WILL FOLLOW.
3. REMAINDER REF A UNCHANGED.

SP-1
BT

3

FLAG ACT.....

TOR 0200Z 24 MAY 67

NR 230/24

[Handwritten Signature]

CWO.....CARL

240020Z MAY 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VV PPNG297APH366ZCMAB94ZZCYMD264

PP RUTPRC

DE RUCIJH4 830C 1450245

ZNY CCCCC

P 241732Z MA Y 67

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT

INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEPJS/JCS/JRC

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

~~RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC~~
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA

RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

- 4. YOUR 240000Z MAY 67
- 1. DEPARTED ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST 240530Z MAY. SOA 15 KTS. ETA ROTA 312000Z MAY. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS WILL BE NECESSARY TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERS AND REFUEL. THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSANDS GALLONS NSFO WILL BE REQUIRED. ETA OPAREA OFF PORT SAID 061400Z JUN 67. REF A PERTAINS
- 2. DO NOT HOLD ANY COMSIXTHFLT INSTRUCTIONS/OPLANS/OPORDERS/TAPV NOTES/ETC. IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO HAVE THEM DELIVERED ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
- 3. UNODIR WILL INCLUDE FOLLOWING COMMANDS AS INFO ADDEES ON DAILY PIR REPORT AFTER ENTRY INTO MEDITERRANEAN: CINCUSNAVEUR/COMSIXTHFLT/DIRNAV SECORUEUR.

GP-4

FLAG ACT. ³.....

TOR 250335Z MAY 67

NR 273/25


CWO.....^h.....DRB

2 4 1 7 3 2 Z MAY 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE	INFO PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	SPECIAL HANDLING NONE
--------------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------

DISTRIBUTION





FROM: JCS-

DATE: 29 MAY 67

INFO:

TO: CINCLANT
USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSERVLANT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSERVRON 8
USS LIBERTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS 6499 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

1. (S) FOR CINCLANT: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND ROTA O/A 31 MAY REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON USCINCEUR.
2. (S) FOR USCINCEUR: UOPN ASSUMING OPCON REQUEST MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT EASTERN MED. WILL PASS SKED ASAP. GP-4

DRAFTER ED/JBH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU) Z
DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS		PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	AGI NR. 39498
AGO		AGO NR.
AGI		
DTG		DTG 291602Z MAY
SUSPENSE		

WNNCZCZ02 683ZCHG77
 RT RUTLKO
 ZNY 00000 ZCV RUFPPA
 NAD7000000NA683ZCYNC629
 RT RUFPPA
 RUEDNKA2 175 1500000
 ZNY 00000

25
Liberty

P 300000Z MAY 57
 TO CINCLANTFLT
 TO RUFPPA/CONSERVANT
 INFO RUENAAA/CNO
 RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
 RUFPPA/JCS/JFC
 RUFPPA/USCINCEUR
 RUFPPA/CONSIXTHFLT

[REDACTED]

RUFPPA/CONSERVON EIGHT

RUFPPA/USC LIBERTY
 RUFPPA/CINCUSNAVEUR

[REDACTED]

- USC LIBERTY CHOP (U)
- JCS 291600Z MAY 57
 - CONSERVON EIGHT 040000Z MAY 57
 - INFORM DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL
ACTA FOR OPS PER REF E.
 - ENSURE CINCLANT JFC AND CINCLANTFLT KEPT INFORMED
LIBERTY MOVEMENTS.
- CF-4
 BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	W N N N N N N N N N N N N X												
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	CITE	S D
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A I D O	NCU
NS		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A I D O	LONDON
NSGE													

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	
SSN	300402
SSN	RB

RB
 DTG 300402Z MAY 57

CONFIDENTIAL
 (WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

CZCKDA193ZCEGR669

DE RUEDSPA4216 1500201
ZNY CCCCC

O 300200Z MAY 67
FM COMSERVRON EIGHT
TO RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
INFO RUEDNKA/CINCLANFLT
RUEDNKA/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUENAAA/COMO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

[REDACTED]

RUIPRC/CONSIXTHFLT

RUIRC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUFBRK/USCINCEUR
RUIPRE/COMSERVFORSSIXTHFLT
BT

PAGE TWO RUEDSPA4216 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- A. MY 281500Z APR 67 NOTAL
- B. CINCLANTFLT 300040Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- 1. FOR COMSERVLANT: ORIG TAKES REF B FORAC.
- 2. FOR LIBERTY: CANCEL THE UNEXECUTED PORTION OF REF A.
CHOP TO USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
- 3. KEEP CINCLANT/JRC AND CINCLANTFLT INFORMED YOUR MOVEMENTS.

CP-4
BT

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

ORIGINATOR SECTION	W X X X X X													
ACTION DEPARTMENT N3 NSGE	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	S	D
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	A	D	O
														NCU LONDON

COM		
TOR		
SSN	30/0099	
SGN	18	

DTG 300200Z MAY 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

TO: USS LIBERTY
INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

COMSIXTHFLT
CINCLANTFLT

THIS IS A CORRECTED COPY
PLEASE DESTROY ORIGINAL COPIES

INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

INFO: USS INCEUR

COMPAIRMED // COMSERVLANT // COMSERVRON EIGHT // CTF SIX ZERO

FOR JRC

CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 7-67 (U)

A. USCINCEUR 360932Z MAY 67 NOTAL

B. COMSERVRON EIGHT 240020Z MAY 67 NOTAL

C. CINCUSNAVEUR 311351Z MAY 67 NOTAL

D. CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 50-66 NOTAL

E. CINCUSNAVEURINST 4235.2D NOTAL

F. CINCUSNAVEUR/USCOM EASTLANTINST 02000 -B

(COMMOPLAN) NOTAL

G. NAVEUROPREP MANUAL OF 1 JUN 66 NOTAL

H. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL

1. UPON CHOP TO CINCUSNAVEUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A,
ENTER PROTA FOR FUEL AND LOADING TECHNICAL/LOGISTICAL
SUPPORT MATERIAL SPECIFIED REF B.

2. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING; AFTER
RECEIPT OF NAVEUR/SIXTHFLT MED PUBS BEING DELIVERED.

33:51 ... COG

92(14) 94(25) 1P(7) 2P(1) BFR(1) *

022420
056

CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC 011035Z/02MAY67/HT/2

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
349049/3/PG	1		2	31/1941Z	311750Z MAY 67

BY COURIER (REF C), AND WHEN REF ABOUT 1 JUNE; DEPART
ATA AND PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FOR EXTENDED
OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IAW
TECH SPECS ISSUED SEPARATELY.

3. REMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS DURING TRANSIT AND
OPERATIONS. YOUR ATTENTION DIRECTED APPENDIX VIII, ANNEX
D, REF D FOR CLAIMED NEB TERRITORIAL SEAS.

4. LOGISTICS IAW REF E.

5. COMMUNICATIONS IAW REF F.

SP-8

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C49049/3/PD	2		2	31/1941Z	311750Z MAY 67

1 JUN 67 03 04

VV KXC027ZCDKA009 VV TVB004
00 RUDLKD
~~DE RUEPBK 002 1520115~~
ZNY ~~SSSS~~
O 010035Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY

BT

~~SECRET~~ ECJC/JRC 08685. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-32 AND N-31. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A: USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
B: CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67

- FOR JCS. REF A STATES THAT USS LIBERTY EXPECTS TO BE RFS 011400Z JUN 67 FROM ROTA. INTEND SHIP PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHEN READY AS OUTLINED REF B. AWAITING YOUR GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO SCHEDULE, OPERATING AREA AND ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
- FOR USNAVEUR. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND ARRANGE FOR LIAISON OFFICER TO MEET USS LIBERTY WITH DOCUMENTS AS REQUESTED REF A. SCHEDULE AND OPERATING AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP. FURTHER REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH REPORTING PROCEDURE TO INSURE

PAGE TWO RUFFPBK 002 ~~SECRET~~
SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z DAILY, AND THAT ANY INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED ASAP IAW CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. GP-4.
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	SECRET										SDO	
	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010		
ACTION DEPARTMENT	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	ADDO	NCU LONDON

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

COR	
FOR	
SSN	01/0300
SEN	B

DTG 010035Z JUN 67

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VV UNCLAS AIRCRAFT
FM RUTPRC
DE RUEKND 1242 1521365
ZNY
F 011302Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO RUTPPAUSS EXMERTY
INFO RUFPRK/USVINCENY
RUEPJS/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEONWF/CINCLANTFLT

[REDACTED]

RUFPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEONWF/CINCLANT
RUEPDSA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEONWF/CINCLANT
RUEONWF/CINCLANT
BT

CINCUSNAVEUR
JCS FOR JCS - CINCLANT FOR JRC
CINCUSNAVEUR MEMORD 7-67 CHANGE ONE (U)
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 PASEP

- 1. MODIFY REF A AS FOLLO:
A. DELETE PARA TWO.

B. INSERT NEW PARA TWO. QUOTE. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING) AFTER RECEIPT OF NAVEUR/SIXTHFLT MED PUBS BEING DELIVERED BY COULIER (REF C); AFTER PERSONNEL INDICATED [REDACTED] (OTHER MEAN ML HAVE REPORTED AND WHEN RFS; REPORT READINESS FOR OPERATIONS, WHEN DETECTED, DEPART ROTA AND PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN- IAN TECH SPECS ISSUED SEPARATELY. OPAREAS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE PROVIDED. UNQUOTE.

- 2. ADD NEW PARAGRAPH SIX. QUOTE. 6. REPORTS.
A. CONDVAR REPORTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IAW REF H.
B. SUBMIT CLASSIFIED SITREP AND POST REPORT AS OF 2400Z DAILY. USE PRIORITY PRECEDENCE UNLESS CONTENT WARRANTS INCREASED SPEED. INCLUDE PIN FOR NEXT 24 HOURS AND COMMENTS/STATUS AS APPROPRIATE. ADDRESS ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR, INFO ADDRESS SAME AS THIS MESSAGE. UNQUOTE.

GP-3
BT

FLAG ACT.....

TOR 011533Z JUN 67

NR 547/01

CWO.....DRB

011305Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE IMMED	INFO PRECEDENCE IMMED	SPECIAL HANDLING NONE	DISTRIBUTION
----------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------



FROM: JCS

DATE: 02 JUN 67

INFO:

TO: USICINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY



~~SECRET~~

JCS 6724 J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY SKED (U)



1. WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:
 - A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.
 - B. 2-8 JUN. ENROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE NAV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MALTA 3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
 - C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5 NM

DRAFTER DGY/JFD	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU) 2
DOCUMENT MARKING	DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED	PAGE 1 OF 2
REF TO MESSAGE 65 [Signature]	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	AGI NR. 40571
AGD AGI DTG		AGD NR. DTG 011545Z 011545Z

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 54
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 53
to be used until deleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMED.

INFO PRECEDENCE
IMMED

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

- 2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INKO ADDRESSEES ON ALL MOVREPS, DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
- 3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.
- 4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKEED FOLLOW.

GP-3

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULI)
DOCUMENT MARKING	PAGE 2 OF 2	
REF TO MESSAGE	DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
AGO	AGI NR.	1403:1
AGI	AGO NR.	DTS

NNNNNOB884827N8848
 DE RUEPBA 212 1522000
 ZNR 00000
 F 010010Z JUN 67

JUN 17 07 48

FM USCINCEUR
 TO RUELEA/CINCUSNAVEUR
 INFO RUEPBA/COSIXTHFLT
 RUEIJVA/USG LIBERTY

R.
 UNCLAS ECCC JRC 0576. NAVEUR FOR N-32. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY
 SUP. REF: A. JCS 0124 011545Z JUN 67.
 REF: A. TOURS FORAC.
 RT.

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR													NCU	LONDON
	001	002	003	008	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A114	A110		
ACTION DEPARTMENT															

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	0625/01
SSN	
SGN	

DTG 012030 2 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DRAFTED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
1 JUNE 1967	PHONE EXT. NO. 396	ACTION		INFO	X		
		INFO		INFO	X		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS LIBERTY//USCINCEUR

INFO: ~~SECRET~~
CINCPACFLT//COMSERVANT//NAVCOMMSTA SPAIR

DEPARTURE OF USS LIBERTY FROM ROTA

A. USCINCEUR ~~OPREP-3~~/JRC 08586 DTG 010419Z JUN 67
 B. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z

1. IN REPLY TO PARA 2 OF REF A, REQUIRED EXTRA PERSONNEL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL ARE NOW ABOARD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA.

2. FOR USCINCEUR,
~~SINCE A COMMUNICATION ADVISORY MESSAGE IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THAT SHIPS SPECIAL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA CONTROL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IS UNDER REPAIR,~~ *HAVE DIRECTED*
 SHIP TO REMAIN ROTA UNTIL ~~SYSTEM IS~~ *REPAIRED.*

3. FOR USS LIBERTY. *REQUEST ADVISE ETR,*
~~REQUEST ADVISE PERSONNEL SERVICES OF DEPARTMENT,~~
~~REPAIRS BEING FROM ROTA CAN BE COMPLETED. SAILING ORDERS WILL FOLLOW. IAW REF B.
GP-4~~

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF READER _____

CCWPO _____

CWO _____

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXX	X		X	X
ACTION DEPARTMENT	001	002	003	004	005
	006	007	008	009	010

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON	
TOR	
SSN	1245 nm
SEN	


DTG 012120 JUN 1967

~~SECRET~~
(WHEN FILLED IN)

15 11643
O 151147Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
INFO CINCPAC/CINCSRON ONE TWO

R 215719Z JUN 67
FM CINCSRONAVEUR
TO USS LIBERTY
INFO USCINCPAC
JCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

REF D

NINE TWO SIX TWO 345 9 1 0 0 0 0

ONE SIX ZERO
ONE SIX FOUR
INFO
USCINCPAC WORO CCO
CONFIDENTIAL

- 1. JCS FOR INFO, CIRCULAR FOR INFO
 - 2. CINCSRONAVEUR 311004Z JUN 67
 - 3. CINCSRONAVEUR 211004Z JUN 67
 - 4. USS LIBERTY 151945Z JUN 67
 - 5. USN RFS TWO JUNE, DEPART OCEAN, SPAIN AND PROCEED IAN REF
- CONFIDENTIAL
BT

~~NNNNCZCKDA 53RZOMGAGAR~~

OO RUDLKD
DE RUIKC 101A 153113Z
ZNY ~~0000~~
O 021132Z MAY 67
FM USS LIBE
TY
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/JCS

RUENAAA/CNO

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUSDNKA/CINCLANTFLT



RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUIKRE/CTF SIXTY
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIXSA/NFOIO

m/c/a

PAGE TWO RUTKC 101A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CICCLANT
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JCS FOR JRC - CINCLANT FOR JRC
RFS (U)

- A. YOUR 011305Z JUN 67
 - 1. TEMPORARY REPAIRS MADE TO TRSSCOMM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. SYSTEM CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL.
 - 2. RFS AT 021230Z. WILL DEPART ROTA AT THAT TIME AND PROCEED BEST SPEED IAW REF A. MOVREP SEPARATE.
- GP-4

BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXXXXXX										CITE	SDO		
	O 0 1 2	N 1 2	N 3 4	N 5 6	N 7									
ACTION DEPARTMENT	<i>NSG</i>										AID	ADO	NCU	LONDON
	O 0 1 2	O 0 3 8	O 0 1 2	O 0 1 3	O 0 1 4	O 0 1 5	O 0 1 6	O 0 1 7						

COM	
TOR	<i>13999/67</i>
SSN	
SEN	<i>ms</i>

DTG *021132Z JUN 67*

3 CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Capt. Owen

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NOV 27 1967
USS LIBERTY

TO 216 240

INFO JCS
CINCANT
CINCANTFLT

DIRNSVSECGRU
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
CONSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR ✓
NEO 11

CONFIDENTIAL
COMPAIRED
RTE SIX ZERO
RTE SIX FOUR
NAVCONNSA MOROCCO
NAVCONNSA GREECE
NAVCONNSA ASHARA

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCANT PASS TO JRC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PPD NOVREP 021330Z9 LIBERTY AGTR-5, 01//
ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR 5, 02//
ETD ROTA SPAIN, 021330Z CO 015 ~~OKG 03//~~
VIA 35-57N8 000-55W, 021730Z CO 015 ~~OKG 04//~~
VIA 37-00N8 012-00E, 050330Z RH 015 ~~OKG 05//~~
ETA 32-00N8 033-00E, 080300Z ~~06//~~
MOD IND 32-00N8 033-30E9 080300Z 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECOPS, CINCUSNAVEUR
311750Z 07//

*OP Directive
dated 311750Z*

USS & OPS details indefinite

33(5) ...COG
92(14) 94(25) 1P(7) F(1) BFR(1)

022420
056

CONTROL NO. 004256/37JH	PAGE 1	NO. OF RECORDS 03/13457	DATE 021330Z 67
----------------------------	-----------	----------------------------	--------------------

USS LIBERTY 021330Z

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ARMY DEPARTMENT

NOT 3 3 3G KIL0 POMBO TANGO TANG0 LIBERTY, 070001Z0 JULIETT RUMBO TANG0
PAGE 2 LIBERTY 0211

011 02133020, 02133029, 015,OK6, 35-57N6, 005-65W6, 021730Z3, 015,OK6,
37-00N0, 012-00E3, 050330Z1, 015,OK6, 35-06N5, 033-00E6, 080300Z1,
32-00N5, 033-30E9, 080300Z1, 311750Z1, 070001Z0, 09//END
3P-4

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C04256/3/JH	2		2	03/1345Z	021330Z JUN 67


~~SECRET~~

INFO BR 14003
010140Z JUN 67
FM COMNAVSTA
TO RUEKJPC/OPRESHOW ONE TWO

010140Z JUN 67
FM JCS LIBERTY
TO CINCSNAVEUR
INFO CNO

JCS
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANT

EMERSON EIGHT
USSINCOUR
USS SIXTH



REF C

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 046 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CNO TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASIFIED
OTD SIX ZERO DN
CTF SIX FOUR

NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS C JRC
PIA (U)

1. 000400Z JUN 67 POSIT 36-10N 108-29W
PIN COASTAL EASTERLY 15 KTS.

2. DEPARTED ROTY 02 2 02Z JUN 67. ETA ON SATIN 0600Z JUN 67.
3. DURING TRANSIT STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR OVERTOOK AND PASSED THREE
SOVIET SHIPS OF UNDETERMINED TYPE STEAMING IN COLUMN ON
COURSE 035 SPEED 113 KTS. TWO SHIPS IDENTIFIED AS SEMEN
DEKNEV AND ANDREY VILASHKIN. TWO SHIPS CALLED LIBERTY BY
FLASHING LIGHT. ONE ASK WHAT SHIP. REPLY SENT WAS QUOTE
U.S. NAVY SHIP UNQUOTE. ONE SHIP ATTEMPTED TO SEND SHIPS

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 046 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NAME DOT LIGHT UNREADABLE. NOT KNOWN IF SHIPS WERE ATTEMPTING
TO COMM OF NOT. HOPING TO ADDITIONAL REPORTS WILL BE
FORWARDED WITH RESPECT TO CONTACTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 010240Z DAILY SITEP AND POSIT 3600H1 NAV
3E-600350N108-29W DELAYED TO AVOID TRANSMITTING AT
TIMES WHICH COULD BE MISINTERPRETED AS SECURITY MATTER
REF 046

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XRAJ NR 0650
R 031016Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO RUTPRC/C OMSIXTHFLT
RUTPRE/C OMSERVFORSIXTHFLT
INFO RUQFNA/USS LIBERTY

X

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

USS LIBERTY OPS (U)

- A. MY 311450Z MAY 67 PASEP (MOV ORD)
- B. MY 01135Z JUN 67 PASEP (MOV ORD) CH. ONE)
- C. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTAL (SKED)
- D. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN THE EASTERN MED
IAW REFS A THRU C. ADDEES MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OR OTHER ASSISTANCE DURING THESE
OPERATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT LIBERTY WILL MAKE
SHORT PORT VISITS IN THE EASTERNMED AT 3 TO 4 WEEK
INTERVALS ALTHOUGH HER ENDURANCE EXTENDS WILL BEYOND
THIS TIME.

2. LIBERTY HAS RECEIVED A MED PUBLICATION PACKAGE LESS THE
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. REFERENCE OF THIS LIST SHOULD
ASSIST IN REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING SHOULD ADDEES
BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LIBERTY.

A. COMSIXTHFLT INSTC 5370.1A, 5840.1, 6000.1, 05510.2N

B. COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT INSTC 4000.1G, 03180.1A

3. REQUEST COMSIXTHFLT PROVIDE COPIES OF THE ABOVE
INSTRUCTIONS TO LIBERTY BY MAIL.

P-4

BT

3
FLAG: ACT.....

TOR 031502Z JUNE 67

NR 582/03 CWO.....CAP

03 10 16Z JUNE 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY
OR IX

KERO
COM

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

THE RUSSIANS TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE ON OUR
 MOVEMENTS, PLACE A STRAIN ON THE TENUOUS RUSSIAN
 LOGISTIC BASE FOR THEIR FLEET AND (IN LIGHT OF
 TODAY'S OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES) IMPROVE OUR POSTURE
 FOR QUICKLY CARRYING OUT WHATEVER TASKS THAT MAY
 BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES ARE
 PROVIDED FOR PRESENT DISPOSITION AND EMPLOYMENT
 OF TF 60:

A. OPERATE FAST CARRIER TASK GROUP SHIPS AND
 AIRCRAFT IN EASTERN MED/AEGEAN NO CLOSER THAN
 100 MILES FROM COASTS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL,
 AND UAR:

~~OPERATED,~~
~~COM~~
~~(GOVT)~~
~~RECOMMENDED~~
~~ST~~
~~AND~~

4. OTHER TASK FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY.

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (3-65)

3

~~SECRET~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>F. J. Shaw</i>	DRAFTED BY CDR LUKK	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
5 JUN 67	T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 454	ACTION		XXX		
			INFO		XXX		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR
 TO: COMSIXTHFLT
 INFO: USCINCEUR//CTF 60

*Return to
OP Com*

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY
 TAPE CUTTER _____
 PROOF READER _____
 CCWPO _____
 CWO _____

~~SECRET~~
 CYPRUS FLIGHT RESTRICTION

1. AIR AND SURFACE OPERATIONS ^{NO CLOSER THAN} TWENTY-FIVE (25) MILES FROM COAST OF CYPRUS ARE AUTHORIZED.

GP-4

K *Plotted*

~~SECRET~~

(PAGE 1 OF 1)


ORIGINATOR SECTION CDO		X	X	X	X	X	X		X			
ACTION DEPARTMENT N3	CINCUSNAVEUR	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	CITE	S	D	O
		001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	A	A	D
		001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011

CON	
TOR	
SSN	1166
SGN	

DTG 051850 Jun 67
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PPNG 632
P 051934Z
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO JCS
CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT



COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NEOIO



COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMED
CTF 60
CTF 64
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT

1. 2400Z POSIT 35-29N 019-10E IPIM 106/15
2. ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE MODIFIED.

GP-4
BT

3

FLAG ACT

TOR 01429Z JUN 67

NR 554/06

[Signature]
CWO 11/MIC

051934Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 166 ~~SECRET~~
TERRITORIAL WATERS OF DODECANESSE ISLANDS UNLESS DIRECTED TO
CONDUCT TRANSIT BETWEEN CYPRUS AND GREECE.
2. THE THREAT IMPOSED BY THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET WARSHIPS AND THE
CURRENT ESTIMATE OF 8-9 SOVIET SUBMARINES DICTATES THAT THE
INHERENT MOBILITY OF THE CVA GROUP BE EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO SOVIETS, AGGRAVATE THE SOVIET
LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND IMPROVE TF 60 POSTURE TO CARRY OUT
WHATEVER TASKS MAY BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.
3. TO INCREASE READINESS POSTURE OF TIS60 DESIRE YOU DIRECT
CARRIER TASK GROUPS TO POSIT 34-30N 30-00E3, EACH CVA GROUP
MOVING SEPARATELY TO THAT POINT WITH A RANDOM PIM. UPON ARRIVAL
PROCEED TO VICINITY 33-45N 32-00E5. THEREAFTER OPERATE TF 60
WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS ESTABLISHED PARA ONE ABOVE
UTILIZING RANDOM PIMS AND UTILIZING PERIODS OF HIGH SPEED TO
DENY SOVIETS THE CAPABILITY TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCES IN A
PARTICULAR AREA FOR SURVEILLANCE. DISPOSITION/FORMATION AT YOUR
DISCRETION TO PROVIDE BEST POSTURE FOR DEFENSE AND TASKING
AS REQUIRED.
4. AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT TASKS
WILL BE ASSIGNED. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS INTENTIONS OF HIGHER

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 166 ~~SECRET~~
AUTHORITY BECOME MORE CLEAR, KEEP TF 60 ON THE MOVE WITHIN
LIMITATIONS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS.
5. FOR CTF 63. WHEN NOT JOINED WITH TF 60 FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT,
DESIRE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP UTILIZE DIVERSIONARY COURSES WITHIN
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY REQUIRED RDVU.

GP-3
BT

000000-050015 250000

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV 11-66
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION



FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

DATE: 8 JUNE 67

ACT:

TO: COMSIXTHFLT
USS LIBERTY
USCINCEUR
JCS
CNO

INFO:



COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NFOIO
NAV COMSTA MOROCCO
CINCLANT
COMSERGFORSIXTHFLT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)

USCINCEUR FOR JRC, JCS FOR JRC, CINCLANT FOR JRC

A. MY 311750Z MAY 67 (LIBERTY MOVORD 7-67, WITH CH-1)

B. MY 031016Z JUN 67

C. USS LIBERTY 021330Z JUN 67 (MOVREP)

D. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 (USS LIBERTY SKED)

E. USS LIBERTY 022108Z JUN 67

1. FOR COMSIXTHFLT. TO FACILITATE AREA COMMAND AND CONTROL AND ANY POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR PROTECTION DURING

DRAFTER TW/EJH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED		PAGE 1 OF 1
REFS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR. 42476
AGO	CONFIDENTIAL	AGO NR.
AGI RLL		DTG 061357Z

MESSAGE

FORM N2280 REV. 5/11/55
(Supersedes N2280 REV. 1/11/55
to be used until depleted)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

WIDEAST HOSTILITIES, USS LIBERTY WILL BE CHOPPED TO COMSIXTHFLT
AT 070001Z JUN 57. OPERATE LIBERTY IAW REF D TO DERIVE MAXIMUM
BENEFIT FROM SPECIAL CAPABILITIES. REF D MAY BE MODIFIED FOR
SAFETY REASONS AS DICTATED BY THE LOCAL SITUATION.

A. REQUEST CHANGE PIM REPORTS (REFS A AND B) TO AS
OF 1800Z, CHANGE PRECEDENCE TO IMMEDIATE AND CHANGE
ADDEE FORIUSCINCEUR TO USCINCEUR FOR JRC.

2. FOR USS LIBERTY. CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z
BY MESSAGE.

A. PIM REPORT NOT RECEIVED SINCE REF E.

GP-3

NOTE: REF "C" IS AGI 41075
REF "D" -- UNABLE TO LOCATE
REF "E" IS AGI 40957

DRAFTER TW/EJH		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED		PAGE 2 OF	
IS TO MESSAGE		AGI NR.	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		AGI NR.	
AGO			DTC
AGI			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

INT PRIORITY 7C

PRIORITY
062036Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY

TO COMSIXTHFLT

INFO CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
JCS
CNO

CINCLANTFLT

COMFAIRMED
COXSERV LANT
COMSERVOPON EIGHT
OPF SIX ZERO
OPF SIX FOUR
NF010
NAVCOMSTA MCR0000
CINCLANT
COMSERVFOR SIXTHFLT

THIS MESSAGE RECEIVED WITHOUT
DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)

USCINCEUR FOR JRC

JCS FOR JRC

CINCLANT FOR JRC

4. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67

3. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66

1. REPORTING YOUR OPCON IAW PARA 2 REF A AT 070001Z JUN 67.

2. FUEL STATE EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT. NORMAL CONSUMPTION WHILE ON STATION
APPROXIMATELY ONE PERCENT PER DAY.
3. ESTIMATED PROVISION ENDURANCE/DAYS:

33(5) ...COG

92(14) 94(25) IP(7) FP(1) BFR(1) +

022420
056

CONTROL NO	PAGE OF PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
010740/3/P0	1	08/0149Z	062036Z JUN 67

- 4. 074/110
- 3. FROZEN/010
- 2. CHILL/75

1. RESUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE MODIFIED. SELF DEFENSE CAPABILITY LIMITED TO FOUR .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS AND SMALL ARMS.

5. CURRENT TERM - PROMULGATING MESSAGE NOT HELD. PARA 8B ANNEX DELTA REF A PERTAIN.

6. REPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC REPAIRMEN ON BOARD WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.

7. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.

8. REQUEST ADVISE TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED/OTHER NECESSARY DATA.

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
010740/3/PO	2		2	08-100-1171	062036Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO ROUTINE

DTG JUNE 6 2050 67


FROM:

JCS

TO:


USCINCEUR


INFO:

CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY


SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION:
J-3
JRC
SJCS


COORDINATION:
CNO
RADM Swanson
76033


SECRET

JCS

7206

J-3 sends.

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U) 

REFS: a. JCS 6724/011545Z Jun 67
b. JCS 5838/052235Z Nov 65 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(b)~~ Request procedures outlined herein be followed in developing schedules for LIBERTY while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility:

a. Planning/approval of routine monthly sked:

(1)  state requirements to CINCUSNAVEUR

including recommended ports of call.

DATE	TIME
06	1700
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	1967
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	R. G. ANDERSON LCDR, USN Recon Programs Div Joint Recon Center, J-3	50581		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD Captain, USN
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	
SECRET			GP-3. Reconnaissance Center	

DD FORM 173
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH MAY BE USED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 5010-108-01-0

JCS 7206 / 062050Z

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SF OR CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY		PHONE		
ACTION PRIORITY		R.G. ANDERSON				
INFO ROUTINE		LCDR, USN		50581		
<p>(2) CINCUSNAVEUR prepare sked to fulfill requirements including dates/areas of ops, CPA's, ports of call for logistics and pass plan to USCINCEUR.</p> <p>(3) USGINCEUR review and pass sked to JCS(JRC) for approval. Proposed skeds are required by JCS NLT 20th of the month preceding the month for which the sked is submitted.</p> <p>(4) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval or modifications.</p> <p>(5) USCINCEUR pass for action.</p> <p>(6) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.</p> <p>b. Modification of approved sked due to changes in technical tasking:</p> <p>(1) [redacted] state requirement to JCS(JRC).</p> <p>(2) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of modification.</p> <p>(3) USCINCEUR pass for action.</p> <p>(4) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.</p> <p>c. Modification of approved sked involving a change of 48 hours or less for operational reasons:</p>						
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION		INITIALS
		2	4			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-3.				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		SECRET

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY		R.G. ANDERSON	
INFO ROUTINE		ICDR, USN	50581

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders and inform JCS(JRC) and USCINCEUR of reason for the change.

d. Modification of approved sked involving a change of more than 48 hours for operational reasons:

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR pass proposed modification to USCINCEUR.

(2) USCINCEUR review and pass to JCS(JRC) for approval.

(3) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval.

(4) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(5) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

2. (U) Ref a is the existing approved sked for June 1967.


3. (e) The following should be addressees on all messages pertaining to skeds or sked changes:

JCS (JRC)

CNO

USCINCEUR

CINCUSNAVEUR




CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	4		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-3				SECRET	

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY		R. G. ANDERSON	59581
INFO ROUTINE		LCDR, USN	



NOTE: USS LIBERTY is not an addressee on these messages.

4. (U) Ref b provides guidance on contingency planning for TRS ops.

5. (U) For [redacted] Request you provide CINCUSNAVEUR your recommended July sked ASAP. GP-3.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	4		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-3.				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

MESSAGE

NO. IN NUMBER REV. 10/65
Supersedes N. 100 1152 (All other
to be used until deleted)
CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL HANDLING

IMMED

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMED

IMMED

TO: CINCUSNAVEUR

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 16 JUN 67

INFO:

TO: USS LIBERTY

INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
JCS
CNO

CONSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NKOIO
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
CINCLANT
CTF SIX THREE
CTF SIX SEVEN
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMS MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL ✓

B. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB ✓

C. SLINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL ✓

D. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67 NOTAL ✓

E. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66 NOTAL ✓

F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL

1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF

B. C AND D.

2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF
UAR ACTIONS. MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR
THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY
THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY

DRAFTER ED/LJH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (DATE)
DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.	PAGE 1	AGI NR. 21157
REFERS TO MESSAGE AGO AGI 110	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	AGI NR. 0623492

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMED

INFO PRECEDENCE
IMMED

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION
ADVISE

VERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT.

IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.

3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.

4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.

5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN SIXTHFLT

6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS. IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.

7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

A. COPY KR BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY XRA BCST.

B. IF PERMENANT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE JO REF E.

C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIRED

D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.

OR ACKNOWLEDGE.

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT

GP-4

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.

OF

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

477

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG

0609107

DE RUEPJS 002C 1580324
 ZNY 5555 ZFD
 Z 070259Z JUN 67 ZFF3
 FM JCS
 TO RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
 INFO RUFPEK/USCINCEUR
 RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
 RUFFBW/CINCUSAFE
 ZEN/DIA

UW
mf

BI
 [REDACTED]
 UCS 7239 /CJCS SENDS.

SUBJ: UAR ALLEGATIONS OF US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL (U)
 1. (S) UAR AUTHORITIES HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY HAVE INFORMATION, PERHAPS THROUGH INTERCEPTS, THAT US PERSONNEL WERE TALKING WITH THE ISRAELIS, OR WERE OTHERWISE INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISRAELIS, LEADING THE UAR TO BELIEVE THAT WE MAY HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.
 2. (S) YOU ARE AWARE OF UAR ALLEGATIONS THAT US CARRIER AIRCRAFT WERE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND ALSO OF OUR PROMPT AND VIGOROUS DENIAL. WE HAVE YOUR

PAGE TWO RUEPJS 002 ~~SECRET~~
 ASSURANCE THAT SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT WERE NOT WITHIN 200 MILES OF EGYPT, SYRIA OR ISRAEL.

3. (S) REQUEST THAT YOU VERIFY ASAP THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT OR ANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET AND THE ISRAELIS. IF THERE WERE ANY TYPE COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, PROVIDE COMPLETE DETAILS ASAP.

4. (S) OF EQUAL INTEREST TO US WOULD BE ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE AS TO ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO GET YOU TO INTERVENE IN THE WAR. FYI THERE HAVE BEEN ALLEGATIONS FROM UAR SOURCES TO THIS EFFECT.

5. (S) INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO COMMENT IF, BUT ONLY IF, THEY HAVE INFORMATION BEARING ON ALLEGATIONS OF US PARTICIPATION IN, OR COLLUSION WITH, ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS. GP-3
 BI

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXX													CITE	S D O
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12		
ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR													A I D O	LONDON
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12		
N3															

(PAGE 1 OF _____)






CON	
TOR	04/16/17
SSN	
SGH	

DTG 070259Z JUN 67

~~SECRET~~
 (WHEN FILLED IN)

ROSTER OF PERSONS VISITED

USCINCEUR

NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
David A. BURCHINAL GENERAL, USAF	Deputy, CINCEUR	14 June 1967
W. J. McCAFFREY M/GEN, USA	Director Operation Directorate (J-3)	14 June 1967
David I. LIEBMEM B/GEN, USAF	Deputy Director for Command and Control	14 June 1967
James FEELY, Jr. B/GEN, USMC	Deputy Director for Operations	14 June 1967
W. G. KILLE COL, USAF	Chief Operation Center Division	14 June 1967
R. L. ROYEM COL, USAF	Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
R. S. QUIGGINS COL, USAF	Deputy Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
G. G. LITTLE CDR, USN	Staff Officer, JRS (J-3)	14 June 1967
C. K. RUSSELL L/COL, USA	JRC Watch Officer (J-3)	14 June 1967
L. H. BERGMAN L/COL, USAF	Staff Officer, Operations & Readiness Divisions (J-6)	14 June 1967
 CAPT HERMES USA	  DCA-Europe Operations	  14 June 1967

MESSAGE

FORM 112288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N4288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~ACTION PRECEDENCE~~

FLASH

~~INFO PRECEDENCE~~

IMMEDIATE

~~REG. AL HANDLING~~

ROUTINE

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 7 JUN 67

INFO:

DISTRIBUTION

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO

USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
DIA

~~SECRET~~

A. JCS 070259Z JUN 67

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO REPEAT NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ANY ISRAELI SOURCE EITHER MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY AND NONE REPORTED BY ANY COMSIXTHFLT SUBORDINATE COMMAND. CONFIRMATION OF LATTER HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS BY FLASH MESSAGE. WILL ADVISE ASAP.

2. AT AMEMB TEL AVIV REQUEST AS SET FORTH IN HIS 291040Z MAY 67 HAVE ACTIVATED RADIO VOICE CIRCUITS. TRANSMISSIONS LIMITED TO TEST COUNTS AND SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ABOVE REPORTED TO SECSTATE IN MY 010155Z JUN 67.

GP-3

NOTE: UNABLE TO LOCATE REF. JCS 070259Z

DRAFTER

TW/EJH

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE

1 OF 1

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

41791

AGO

AGI

75

DTG

SUBPENSE

AGO NR.

DTG

0706267

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)~~SECRET~~


SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
FLASH	IMMEDIATE	NONE

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 7 JUNE 67

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
DIA


DISTRIBUTION

DIR

~~SECRET~~

A. COMSIXTHFLT 070626Z JUN 67

1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.

2. PRIOR TO 052015Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 30E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES. AT 052015Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 10 MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.

3. ON 5 MAY BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.

PAGE

1 OF 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

43119

AGO NR.

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET~~

DTG

071503Z

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 88
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 65
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM 0828Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER.

4. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING FIGURES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.

5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER

DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE 2 OF 3	
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.		PAGE 2 OF 3	
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		AGI NR.
AGO	SECRET		43119
AGI			AGO NR.
DTG			DTG
CLASSIFICATION			071503Z

MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 61
(Supersedes N2288 REV AUG 60
to be used until depleted)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1
ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.

GP-3



DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.

PAGE

3 OF 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

43119

AGO

AGO NR.

AGI

DTG

~~SECRET~~

DTG

071503Z

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
IMMEDIATE	IMMEDIATE	NONE

FROM: USS LIBERTY ✓ DATE: 8 JUNE 67 INFO:

TO: COMSIXTHFLT -

INFO: JCS
CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANFLT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CINCUSNAVEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
USCINCEUR
NEOIO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMFAIRMED
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS PASS TO JRC

USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC

CINCLANT PASS TO JRC

SITREP/POSIT

A. USCINCEUR 0614-0Z JUN 67 (NOTAL) ✓

1. 070800Z POSIT 33-06N2 28-54E9. PIM 09/16.5 UNTIL 072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.

2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTED AS OF 0800Z

IN REF A. GP-4

TOR C6F
080036Z

DRAFTER TW/EJH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
-------------------	-------------------	--------------------

DOCUMENT MARKING DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.	PAGE 1 OF 1
--	----------------

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR. 42085
AGO	CONFIDENTIAL	AGO NR.
AGI		DTG 070908Z
DTG		
SUSPENSE		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION


FROM: JCS

9 JUN 67

INFO

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 67
USS LIBERTY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: -USS LIBERTY (U)

R: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67

1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHANGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM.

GP-4

DRAFTER ED/SS		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (20)
DOCUMENT MARKING		DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS	
REFERS TO MESSAGE	95	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF
AGO	<i>DM</i>	CONFIDENTIAL	AGI NR. 42/86
AGI			AGO NR.
DTG			072230Z 072230Z

CALL TO NAVEUR 7 JUNE 2350Z

This is Major Breedlove in JRC in Washington.

Yes, say again, who is this?

Major Breedlove in JRC. I would like to speak with your duty officer, please.

This is Lt Thompson.

Are you familiar with LIBERTY operations?

No Sir, I have someone who can.

Yes, and who will that be, please?

Lt. Galapotti, Wait one.

Yes sir, major?

Yes, Major Breedlove in JRC in Washington. Have some word for your reference USS LIBERTY. Do you have a pencil and ready to copy?

Yes sir.

O.K. I am making reference to a COMSIXTHFLT msg DTG 071503Z June which you were an info addee on.

Yes sir.

Now, we request the LIBERTY Comply.

Request LIBERTY to --

Comply.

I can't get that word -- spell please.

Comply - c o m

Right

Comply with new SIXTHFLT

Yes.

OP area defined last sentence.

You are coming in garbled Major - defined

Last sentence.

Last spell out, please, you are still coming in garbled.

S e n t e n c e

Ah, right.

Maybe I'd better start over so you can get texture

No sir, I can read up to request the LIBERTY comply with
op area defined.

Last sentence in para 2

Last sentence in para 2

of ~~COM~~SIXTHFLT

of COMSIXTHFLT

Msg 071503Z June (Yes) until further notice (Yes) and
that is NOT CLOSER THAN

Not closer than

100

100

Nautical miles

Nautical miles -----

to Israel (right), Syria (right), Egypt (right - that's
UAR) and 25 NM - that is two five

25 NM

to Syprus (right) end of message. (right) Now read
back please.

JRC msg - is this DTG or verbal?

This is verbal I am giving you right now, it will be followed by a written message in the morning.

Right - reference COMSIXTHFLT msg 071503Z Jun, request LIBERTY comply to 6th Flt op area defined last sentence para 2 of SIXTHFLT msg 071503Z until further notice and not closer than 100 NM to Israel, Syria, UAR and 25NM to Syprus - is that affirmative?

That is affirmative.

And you are Major --

Major Breedlove.

Spell last name, please.

B r e e d l o v e

That's Major Breedlove in JRC EUCOM?

No JRC Washington and May I have a spelling on your name?

G a l a p o t t i, Lt. Galapotti. I'll send it down to 6th Flt and you say there will be a follow on?

Yes, there will be a follow on.

Yes sir.

Yes, I called because time is getting short to where she will be in those limits.

Looks to me like she's almost there.

Yeah, that's right so go mushy, mushy.

Yes sir, Roger, we will go to 6th Flt and info her and she will probably ll ll or something and (this word is garbled) away.

OK

OK, will get that out right now to 6th FLT on this.

Thank you.

You're welcome.

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: CJCS-1(6) DJS-3(7-9) SJCS-3(10-12)
J3-8(13-20) JRC-3(21-23) GEN
LEMNITZER-1(24) ANMCC/NEACP/NECAP
FILE-1(CY#1) (20) CV

CY#2 DACC CY#3 JRC COMEBACK

ADV CYS#4 AND #5 TO NMCC

080110Z JUN 67

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

TYPE MSG ROOM MULTI SINGLE
X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE

DYO

FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY


IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION

J-3
JRC
SJCS

COORDINATION

CNO
CAPT KING



~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS

7347

J 3 Sends.

ZFF-3

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REFS: a. JCS 7337/072230Z Jun 67 (Message Follows)

b. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z Jun 67 (NOTAL) (Message Follows)

1. (U) Cancel ref a.

2. (U) Req LIBERTY comply new op areas defined last

sentence para 2. ref b, until further notice, i.e., not
closer than 100 NM to ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT and 25 NM to

Cyprus. GP-3

22

REFS ARE:

a. JCS 7337
b. IN 61629

DATE	TIME
7	
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	1967
PAGE NO	NO OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

50581

SIGNATURE

SAM ROREX, JR.
Capt, USN
Chief, Recon Programs Div, JRC

MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD
Captain, USN

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS/INSTRUCTIONS JCS 7347/080110Z
AD Reconnaissance Center

44

081349Z

VV KXC 08PRC010
A *****Z RUTPRQ
DE RUTPRC 09 1591417
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~
Z 081417Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RXFEC/USNMR SHAPE
RUFFAG/CINCUSAFE
RUFFBW/CINCUSAREUR
RUTPRG/OCA SLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLKD/CINCORAD
RUEPNAAB/COMIDEASTFOR
RUTPCR/CINCSTRIKE
RUEDPSA/USCINCEAFSA
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
081349Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT

*DUPE
CIC
meloc
Has [unclear]
[unclear] 7*

~~BT
NET O [unclear]~~

CRITIC
SSS 4 LIBERTY POSIT 31-23N 33-25E HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD AT 081230Z
TH EE UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS IN VICINITY. LIBERTY LISTING BADLY.
MESSAGE FROM LIBERTY AUTHENTICATED.

GP-4
C FT 159 3 8 DTG 081349Z CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BT

NNNN

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FF1-3
N62
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Contingency Watch Team
To: CINCUSNAVEUR
Via: Deputy Chief of Staff

Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES

EVENTS

072350Z

Major BREELOVE, JRC WASHDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VOCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.

LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080001Z

LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080010Z

CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT.

CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

of a message and had by passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

080030Z

The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

080325Z

The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 080110Z. As he was relaying this information the Duty Yecman handed the JCS 080110 message, which had just been received, to CDR JORGENSEN.

The Command Center Duty Officer then had Communications set up a Telecon to COMSIXTHFLT so that he could talk to COMSIXTHFLT's staff duty officer.

080355Z

Considerable delay was caused by atmospheric difficulties. After being unable to establish a Telecon circuit CDR JORGENSEN had the radio operator contact COMSIXTHFLT by SRB and request a Telecon with the Staff Duty Officer as soon as possible.

080410Z

Two way Telecon was established, with COMSIXTHFLT still having difficulty receiving CINCUSNAVEUR. CDR GUNNER, COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, informed CDR JORGENSEN they did not hold JCS 080110Z. CDR JORGENSEN passed it

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

to him three times before receiving an acknowledgement at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a wirenote "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.

080507Z ✓ CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.

080515Z After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."


080521Z Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and constitutes the records as they took place.


CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN


CDR G.D. JORGENSEN, USN


J.A. HARAVOFF, USN


~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRC 305
0 080634Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO COMSIXINFLT
INFO JCS
CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANFLT



CINCSNAVEUR
DIRNAUSEGRLANT
COMSERVANT
COMSERVANT B
USCINCPAC
ETC TO



COMFARMED
CIP 50
CIP 54
NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCPAC PASS TO JRC
SETRET/POSIT

1. SEPARATE POSIT 31-45N 083-30E. PIM WITHIN 50 NM OF ABOVE POSIT

GP-4
BT

3


PLAS 101.....

TCR: 080123Z JUN 67

NR: 46470B

CWO.....//080777

0 8 0 6 3 4 Z JUN 67



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR NR 05552
OP 080742Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRMOB
PATRON SIGONELLA
ATSON ROTA
CEP 60
CIG 08.2
CIU 68.8
CTU 08.2.5
USCINCPACAFSA
COMIDEASTFOR
INFO SECNAV
CNO
CINCLANTFLT
USCINCEUR
FIDEIR
CINCUSAFE
CINCONAD
DIA
OSD (ISA)
COMSERVPLANT
COMSERVON EIGHT
BT

UNCLAS E F I O LOCATING TWO
TWO DELTA WING SINGLE ENGINE JET FIGHTER A/C ORBITED USS LIBERTY
THREE TIMES AT 31-27N, 34-00 AT TIME 08/0650Z. NO IDENT, VISIBLE
DYE ALT. EST. 5,000 FT, DISTANCE EST. 2. MILES. NO AMPLIFYING
REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED.
BT

2
FLAG ACT.....

TOP 082010Z JUN 67

MSG NR 410/08

CWO.....JAL

080742Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFO: SH(6) J3(4) CDC(1) (12)aps/C

BKN277ZOMMAJ83

4 8 1 4 0
1012

EX CY: RF(3)(15)mjs/VP

OO RUPPEK

ADD DIST: J6(1) (16)rdm/W PER CAPT JOY

EOM

DE RUTPRC 052 1590917 J6.

ZNY SSSSS WEM CYS JRC(2)(18)jdw/VP PER LTC RUSSELL
JRC DO. 13JUN67.

8 JUN 67 12 56z

O P 030917Z JUN 67

USE COM

FM COMCENHFLT

TO RUTPP/USS LIBERTY ←

INFO RUEPJS/JCS

RUFPEK/USCINCEUR

RUEKAA/DNO

EMERG STAFF

RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

GROUPS
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUDLKB/CIRCUSNAVEUR

RUFRR/CTF SIX FOUR

[REDACTED]

RUFRC/;084,-;3:47374

47500/CTF SERSZERO

RUFRR/CTF SIX SEVEN

BT

(5)

558c
080917z

8

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS

A. JCS 079545Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

C. COMSIXTEFLT 062349Z JUN 67H

1. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED IMMEDIATE TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40N0/32-30E8 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.

2. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-3

BT REF: 079545 and 080110 Cannot identify in SMD
62349 ECIN 47127

~~SECRET~~

KUS

XRAJ FR1985
Z NO DTG 081235Z
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUEKRO/CINCSNAVEUR
INFO RUPRO/C6 SIXTHFLT
RUTKRE/CTF 57 ZERO

BT

(NO CLASS RECD)

FOLLOWING RECD FROM USNS LIBERTY.

I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33.25E 31.23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQ IMMED (MISSED PORTION)

NOTE: NO AUTHENTICATION RECEIVED. INTERCEPTED E04, 04 FROM
USS SARATOGA.

BT

FLAG ACT.....

TOR 081243Z JUN 67

NR 482/88

CWO.....

NO DTG 28 JUN 67

~~YQJQ DE JH-Z~~

- Z - 081255Z

-FM NURS

-TO CINCORAVUR

-INFO BQOC

J1.CC / YQ.1Q

BT

OLLNWHG
RECIRED

RECEIVED URGON ROCKSTAR TRW UNDER ATTACK MY POSIT

31.23N 33.25E . I HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE .

TOP 1220Z

BT

B Z

ADK CORRECTLY

DE / 1242 Z

65A

7/8
1/8

FAS

FLAS
Z 081254Z JUN 67
FM USS SARATOGA

TO CINCSNAVEUR

INFO CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
COMSIXTHFLT

EFTO

UNCLAS E F T O

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM USS LIBERTY
HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE
IMMEDIATELY

M/R THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

034200

33(8) ...COG
SN(4) 00(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
OPA(1) + 34 94

107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C11511/2/58	1		1	08/14/5Z	081254Z JUN 67

USS SARATOGA 081254Z

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT


FLASH
Z 081301Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

TO COMSIXTHFLT
CTF SIX ZERO
CINCJSNAVEUR

UNCLAS

FOLLOWING RCVD VIA VOICE HICOM FROM *USS LIBERTY*
QUOTE
AT 081253Z AT 081253Z WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO
STDB SIDE LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY
UNQUOTE

M/R WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY



33(8) ...COG
SN(4) 00(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1); 090(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) 1P(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
OPA(1) + 34 94 61

03420C

107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
<i>011671/3/58</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>1</i>	<i>08/1535Z</i>	<i>081301Z JUN 67</i>

NAVCOMMSTA GREECE 081301 Z

NONE

ACTION PRECEDENCE
FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE
FLASH

SPECIAL HANDLING
LFTO

DISTRIBUTION

TO: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 10 JUNE 67

INFO: AIG 998

IC
CNO
CIT 60
CIO 60.2

UNCLAS E F T O

UNCLAS FLASHSITREP/06001/COMSIXTHFLT 081315Z JUN 67.

ATTACK ON LIBERTY

SITREP ONE

1. AT 081252Z USS LIBERTY REPORTED UNDER ATTACK AT POSIT 31.83N 33.25E, WAS HIT BY TORPEDO AND WAS LISTING BADLY. ATTACK FORCES HEREBY DECLARED HOSTILE BY COMSIXTHFLT IAW CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B. LIBERTY MESSAGE AUTHENTICATED.
2. HAVE DIRECTED TF 60 TO PROCEED TOWARD SCENE. TASK FORCE 60 PRESENT POSIT 34.22N 24.28E.
3. HAVE DIRECTED AMERICA TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S AND SARATOGA TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A1'S WITH FIGHTER COVER TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF LAND. TANKERS ALSO WILL LAUNCH, WILL RELIEVED ON STATION.
4. ETA FIRST ACFT ON SCENE ONE HOUR AND 30 MINS AFTER LAUNCH. ESTIMATE LAUNCH AT 1345Z.

DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING			PAGE 1 OF 1
THIS NOTE THIS MESSAGE HANDLED BY P21 MAT-AGI-AAH-FOR-MR. BYTEL			AGI NR. 42925
REFERS TO MESSAGE			AGO NR.
AGO	NONE		DTG 081320Z
AGI			
DTG			
SUSPENSE			

UNCLAS
Z 081340Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO USS LIBERTY

INFO NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

UNCLAS

1. ESTABLISH IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY MED AREA COMMSTA.
2. NAVCOMMSTA CAMS MOROCCO TAKE ALL AVAILABLE ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH USS LIBERTY REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.
3. FOR USS LIBERTY: REQUEST CONFIRM REPORT OF ATTACK.

FOR THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

034200

33(8) ... COG
SN(4) 00(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
C4(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
C08(1) IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
CPA(1) + 34 94

107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C11663/2/35	1		1	081611Z	081340Z JUN 67

CINCUSNAVEUR 081340 Z

NNNVVV KXC273
 JTQ Z PVV AGB551VV ~~FRESOT~~
 OO ~~RU3LKD~~
 DE RUTPRE 607 1591410
 ZNY ~~08000~~
 O 081410Z JUN 67
 FM CTF SIX THREE
 TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
 INFO RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
~~RU3LKD/CINCUSNAVEUR~~
 RUTFP/USS PAPAGO
 BT

c/mc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SALVAGE OPERATIONS

A. YOUR 081320Z JUN 67 NOTAL

1. FOR COMSIXTHFLT: RECOMMEND PAPAGO BE DIVERTED AT MAXIMUM SPEED TO PROCEED VICINITY 31-23N9 33-25E3 TO ASSIST LIBERTY.
2. FOR PAPAGO, IF COMSIXTHFLT CONCURS DIVERT FROM PRESENT POSIT AND PROCEED TO VICINITY POSIT PARA ONE TO ASSIST LIBERTY. ADVISE ALCON ETA. UPON ARRIVAL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SALVAGE OPERATIONS OR ASSIST LIBERTY AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

GP-4
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	[Handwritten marks]													CITE	S O	A D C	A I I C	HCU LONDON
	C	O	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N					
ACTION DEPARTMENT	C	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	A	A	HCU		
	1	2	3	3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	7	7	4	4	LONDON		

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	165818
SSI	
SGN	TC

DTG 081410 2 JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(WHEN FILLED IN)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XRAJ NR 2005
 Z 0814Z JUN 67
 FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
 TO R-EP/WHITE HOUSE
 RUEP/000
 RUEP/AA/CNO
 RUEHC/DEPT STATE
 RUHQCF/COM SIXTHFLT
 RUEDPPS/CINCSTRIKI
 RUDLKD/CINCHAVEUR
 RUEKDA/JCS
 INFO RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEHDT/USUN
 RUFPSK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
 RUTPR/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
 RUFPSW/USAFE
 RUFPA/CINCSAREUR
 RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
 BT

0825 JUN 67.
 ALUSNA CALLED TO FLC TO RECEIVE REPORT. ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
 AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,
 POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
 IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND OBJECT
 APLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
 WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
 BT

FLAG ACT.....

TOR: 08/1428Z JUN 67

NR: 522/08 CWO...../// (PG)///

CITE LOGGED

10 8 1 4 1 4Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNVV KXC141VV AGR682VV NYC979

O RUTPRQ

NY CCCCC ZFD RUTPRC 220 1600420

O RUFEC RUFPAQ RUFPEK RUTPRQ RUFPEW RUFIC RUFRE RUEDNKA

UDLKD RUEFNAA RUEDPSA RUTKRE RUTPCR

E RUTPRC 116 /291521V

ZNY CCCCC

R 081521Z JKZ 67

M COMSIXTHFLT

O RUFPEK/USCINCEUR

UTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

KEEC/USNMR SHAPE

UFPAQ/CINCUSAFE

UFPEW/CINCUSAREUR

UFIC/OCA SLANT AKCOGEN FRANKFURT

UFRE/COMFAIRMED

UEDNKA/CINCLANT

UEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

UDLKD/CINCNORAD

UEFNAA/COMIDEASTFOR

UFPC/CINCSTRIKE

UEPFA/USCINCKEAFSA

RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO

R 081349Z JUN 67

M COMSIXTHFLT

[REDACTED]

BT

Duplex
8-C-332
DAW3

MC/SPD

~~MSG TWO RUTPRC 116 N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FOLLOWUP NR 1 AND FINAL TO COMSIXTHFLT CRITIC 1-67

1. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP AT 081200Z, POSIT 31-25N, 33-33E.

2. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

3. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

4. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

5. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

6. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

7. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

8. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

9. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

10. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

11. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

12. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

13. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

14. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

15. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

16. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

ATTACKED US NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

ANNEX D

COMMUNICATIONS TABS

COMMUNICATIONS TABS

- TAB 1 Analysis of JCS message 7337/072230Z Jun 67
 (20 mile CPA message)
- TAB 2 Analysis of JCS message 7347/080110Z Jun 67
 (100 mile CPA message)
- TAB 3 Summary of Events for JCS message 7347/080110Z
 Jun 67
- TAB 4 USCINCEUR message 080625Z Jun 67 (action
 directive to CINCUSNAVEUR)
- TAB 5 COMSIXTHFLT message 080917Z Jun 67 (instruction
 to USS LIBERTY on 100 mile limitation)
- TAB 6 Traffic volume of NAVCOMSTAS
- TAB 7 NATO Wide Awake Exercise Message
- TAB 8 Analysis of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z Jun 67
 (policy for SIXTHFLT operations)
- TAB 9 Analysis of USS LIBERTY message 080742Z Jun 67
 (overflight of two jet aircraft)

Naval Communication Station Asmara

3. Messages Handled

1 Feb	1,019
2 Feb	1,233
3 Feb	1,253
4 Feb	1,054
5 Feb	974
6 Feb	823
7 Feb	1,039
8 Feb	1,094
9 Feb	955
10 Feb	830
11 Feb	772
12 Feb	925

Total 12,002

1 Jun	1,510
2 Jun	1,261
3 Jun	1,266
4 Jun	1,241
5 Jun	1,570
6 Jun	1,573
7 Jun	1,591
8 Jun	2,280
9 Jun	1,227
10 Jun	1,480
11 Jun	1,516
12 Jun	1,515

Total 19,695

Naval Communication Unit London

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	368	1 Jun	1,530
2 Feb	327	2 Jun	1,408
3 Feb	969	3 Jun	1,377
4 Feb	872	4 Jun	1,317
5 Feb	846	5 Jun	1,407
6 Feb.	842	6 Jun	1,477
7 Feb	695	7 Jun	1,385
8 Feb	704	8 Jun	1,377
9 Feb	313	9 Jun	1,337
10 Feb	858	10 Jun	1,389
11 Feb	914	11 Jun	1,030
12 Feb	<u>984</u>	12 Jun	<u>1,374</u>

Total 10367 Total 17,248

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	2
6 Jun	2
7 Jun	20
8 Jun	17
9 Jun	8
10 Jun	<u>28</u>

Total 77

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	153
6 Jun	143
7 Jun	176
8 Jun	232
9 Jun	201
10 Jun	<u>244</u>

Total 1,214

Naval Communication Station Spain

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	6,873
2 Feb	7,182
3 Feb	7,039
4 Feb	8,645
5 Feb	4,467
6 Feb	5,906
7 Feb	6,620
8 Feb	7,351
9 Feb	7,793
10 Feb	7,718
11 Feb	6,909
12 Feb	<u>4,929</u>

1 Jun	9,002
2 Jun	9,210
3 Jun	8,101
4 Jun	5,900
5 Jun	7,204
6 Jun	7,008
7 Jun	7,101
8 Jun	8,000
9 Jun	7,000
10 Jun	6,000
11 Jun	8,000
12 Jun	<u>6,000</u>

Total 80,103

Total 89,000

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	37
6 Jun	29
7 Jun	31
8 Jun	95
9 Jun	13
10 Jun	<u>18</u>

Total 223

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	162
6 Jun	155
7 Jun	119
8 Jun	89
9 Jun	73
10 Jun	<u>92</u>

Total 692

Naval Communication Station Growth

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	5,901
2 Feb	6,775
3 Feb	6,249
4 Feb	5,506
5 Feb	3,392
6 Feb	5,160
7 Feb	5,941
8 Feb	6,521
9 Feb	6,529
10 Feb	6,935
11 Feb	5,293
12 Feb	4,419

Total 69,122

1 Jun	10,110
2 Jun	10,707
3 Jun	10,110
4 Jun	8,213
5 Jun	8,224
6 Jun	8,010
7 Jun	9,719
8 Jun	10,074
9 Jun	9,887
10 Jun	10,400
11 Jun	8,078
12 Jun	7,825

Total 112,618

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	96
6 Jun	209
7 Jun	114
8 Jun	251
9 Jun	192
10 Jun	341

Total 1,190

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	134
6 Jun	218
7 Jun	162
8 Jun	181
9 Jun	181
10 Jun	179

Total 1,055

Naval Communication Station Harewood

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	7,595	1 Jun	11,217
2 Feb	7,603	2 Jun	10,271
3 Feb	8,033	3 Jun	9,911
4 Feb	7,370	4 Jun	9,826
5 Feb	8,222	5 Jun	8,754
6 Feb	6,943	6 Jun	8,336
7 Feb	7,361	7 Jun	8,512
8 Feb	8,153	8 Jun	22,125
9 Feb	8,052	9 Jun	8,076
10 Feb	8,255	10 Jun	9,122
11 Feb	7,302	11 Jun	7,722
12 Feb	5,205	12 Jun	8,771
Total	87,963	Total	114,933

II. Flash Messages Handled


5 Jun	23
6 Jun	16
7 Jun	25
8 Jun	124
9 Jun	12
10 Jun	3
Total	203

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	109
6 Jun	107
7 Jun	133
8 Jun	252
9 Jun	52
10 Jun	90
Total	749

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE COMSIXTHFLT, DTG 080917Z June 1967

~~"COMSIXTHFLT 100 MILE IMPLEMENTING MSG TO USS LIBERTY"~~



Delayed due to internal staffing and in station traffic of equal or higher precedence traffic.

Delayed by equal or higher precedence traffic.


Misrouted through personnel err to NAVCOMMSTA Greece.

Volume of in station traffic precluded giving attention to this missent message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE USCINCEUR MESSAGE
ECJC/JRC 09045/080625Z June 1967

Confirms telecon to CINCUSNAVEUR to take JCS 080110Z for action.



Delayed by equal or higher precedence traffic.

Delayed by in station, equal or higher precedence traffic.

No evidence this message was received by the USS LIBERTY, based upon information provided by US Navy Court of Inquiry.


Tab 4 to Annex D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE JCS MESSAGE 7347/080110Z June 1967

"JCS 100 MILE MESSAGE"



* Guam sent message to Kunia with instructions to relay to Morocco. Kunia misrouted to DACC in error.

In all cases, delays in transmission from the DACC were caused by the unusually large amount of flash precedence traffic and other immediate precedence traffic which was also awaiting transmission. Messages are handled by precedence in the order received in DACC; first in first out by precedence. During period of such large volume of traffic, it is virtually impossible to determine if the subject matter of a message warrants its transmission before another message of the same precedence.

@ NSA dead-end terminal. Could not relay over General Service Communications. Did not return to DACC. Filed without action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB 2 to Annex D

(Revised - 29 June 1967)

PRIORITY JCS MESSAGE 7337/072230Z


"20 MILLI MESSAGE"

TIME

072230Z Jun

NMCC/MC

11 min



*See Note

4 hrs 12 min

1 hr 22 min

8 hr 40 min

13 min

7 min

081315Z

Info 2hr 15 min

COMSIXTHFLT
080630Z

Action

CINCEUR

Info

CNO

Info

Misrouted to

Kunia Pacific Relay

Non-delivery

USS LIBERTY

*NOTE: Cancelled by JCS 7347, DTG 080110Z (Elapsed time between events, 2 hrs 40 min).

TAB 1 to
Annex D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NAVAL MESSAGE

10 June 1967

MESSAGE NUMBER DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)
101 14 16 00

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO: USDOCOSTRIKFORSOUTH

~~SECRET~~

EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67

1. THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY AT 081230Z4 SET OFF A CHAIN OF EVENTS REQUIRING EXTENSIVE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO BE INTRODUCED FOR MANY HOURS INTO A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH ALREADY HAD IMPOSED MINIMIZE TO REDUCE THE ABNORMAL VOLUME OF TRAFFIC CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.
2. EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67 WAS CONDUCTED 081700Z6. THE FIRST COPIES OF THE NATO MESSAGE LACKED ONE PHONETIC LETTER IN LINE BRAVO, THUS MAKING NATIONAL AUTHENTICATION OF NATO MSG INITIALLY IMPOSSIBLE. A CORRECTION MSG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED. NUMEROUS COPIES OF NATIONAL MSG CONTAINED QUOTE 5-67 UNQUOTE VICE 9-67. DUE TO THE ECHO EFFECTS OF USEUCOM/ACE COMMAND REACTION COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL AND NATO VERSIONS (INCLUDING DUPLICATIONS), WERE RECEIVED IN EXCESS OF 125 TIMES DURING A TWO HOUR PERIOD OVER ALL CIRCUITS AVAILABLE TO COMSIXTHFLT. THESE HIGH PERCEDENCE EXERCISE MESSAGES INTERFERED WITH ACTUAL HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

~~SECRET~~

Tab 7 to
Annex D

~~SECRET~~

3. SINCE WIDE AWAKES ARE SACEUR INITIATED EXERCISES, IT IS ASSUMED THAT WIDE AWAKE 9-67 WAS IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE SACEUR WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EXISTING SITUATION AT 081700Z6. HOWEVER IT IS SUBMITTED THAT PROCEDURES SHOULD EXIST WHEREBY HIGHER NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN PREVENT EXERCISE INTERFERENCE WITH AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY.

4. IT IS URGED THAT IN THE FUTURE ALL COMM/ALERT EXERCISES BE SUSPENDED WHENEVER ACTUAL ALERTS OR DEFCONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED AND WHEN ACTUAL SIXTHFLT EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS OR MINIMIZE HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT.

GP-4

~~SECRET~~

COMSIXTHFLT MESSAGE 071503Z

(States policy that SIXTHFLT will operate 100NM from UAR, Syria and Israel)

Navy

JCS

071503Z (Date Time Group of Message)

071548Z

Received at Navy Comm Center via Cheltenham

071549Z

Transmitted to Flag Plot

071548Z

071630Z

Received at DACC Advance copies transmitted

071630Z


NMCC Message Center

071633Z

Transmitted to NMCC

071630Z


USS LIBERTY MESSAGE 080742Z
(Overflight by two jet aircraft)



Delays attributed to equal or higher precedence traffic.

ANNEX E

CHARTS



SECRET

Army Map Service (AM), Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Wash. D. C. 1944 from Europe 1:2,000,000. (SSC)

ANNEX F

MEMO FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS,

DATED 18 JUN 67



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS GROUP

18 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


Subject: Fact-Finding Team (U)

1. (S) The Fact-Finding Team established in accordance with MJCS 271-67, dated 15 June 1967, has substantially completed gathering of all pertinent facts relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the USS LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 8 June 1967, which culminated in the attack on the ship on or about 081210Z June 1967.

2. (U) The final report of the Fact-Finding Team is being completed as a matter of priority and will include a complete compilation of record information, as well as an analysis of all related facts. Appropriate recommendations will be submitted.

3. (S) Preliminary examination of the information available indicates the following:

a. There were four (4) messages disseminated during the period of 7-8 June 1967 from higher headquarters to subordinate echelons containing revisions to previous instructions regarding the assigned operating location of USS LIBERTY. Since each of these message transmissions contained instructions for substantially increasing the closest point of approach (CPA) to the UAR and Israel, the receipt of any one of these by the USS LIBERTY would undoubtedly have resulted in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene of action then underway between Israel and the UAR. Although the USS LIBERTY was either an action or an information addressee on each of these directives, there is no evidence available to confirm that the ship's Captain received any one of them.



An identification of these directives and a brief summary of each follows:

Identification

Remarks

(1) JCS message #7337
DTG 072230Z Jun 67
Action: USCINCEUR
Info: CINCUSNAVEUR,
COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY,
and others

Advised in view of situation in E. MED., operating area previously specified "for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." Designated CPA 20 NM from UAR and 15 NM from Israel.

(2) JCS message #7347
DTG 080110Z Jun 67
Action: USCINCEUR
Info: CINCUSNAVEUR,
COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY,
and others

Requested LIBERTY comply with geographical constraints imposed on 6th Fleet units, "i.e., not closer than 100 NM Israel, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM Cyprus."

(3) USCINCEUR message
ECJB/JRC 09045, DTG
080625Z Jun 67
Action: CINCUSNAVEUR
Info: COMSIXTHFLT, USS
LIBERTY, JCS, and others

Confirms verbal instructions to "take for action" JCS 7347 (a.(2) above)

(4) COMSIXTHFLT message
DTG 080917Z Jun 67
Action: USS LIBERTY
Info: JCS, USCINCEUR,
CINCUSNAVEUR, and others

Directs LIBERTY to "proceed immediately" to new operating location. "Do not approach coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 NM and Cyprus closer than 25 NM. Acknowledge."

b. A preliminary examination has been made of the circumstances relating to each of the above. The failure of the USS LIBERTY to receive any one of these time-critical revisions to operational directives can be attributed to a combination of (1) human error, (2) high volume of communications traffic, and (3) lack of appreciation of sense of urgency regarding the movement of the LIBERTY.

c. In recognition of the fact that the ship was approaching her initially assigned area (12.5 NM UAR and 6.5 Israel), action was initiated through the JCS/JRC Duty Officer direct to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center via secure voice, requesting that "LIBERTY be instructed to comply" with previous geographical constraints imposed by COMSIXTHFLT on air and sea units, i.e., no closer than 100 NM from UAR and Israel and 25 NM from Cyprus. NAVEUR advised JCS/JRC Duty Officer that prompt action would be initiated to inform COMSIXTHFLT. By separate action, both JCS/JRC Duty Officer and CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer informed the USCINCEUR Command Center. Some four hours and forty-five minutes elapsed before these instructions were relayed to COMSIXTHFLT for action. Based on preliminary analysis of available information, the following findings apparently contributed to this delay:

(1) JCS/JRC did not use normal command channels but, in the interest of expediency, issued operational instructions direct to a ~~commander~~ commander (CINCUSNAVEUR). Proper follow-up action was taken to advise USCINCEUR of the request for action passed to CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer and that "he had taken action." As it developed, this was an unwarranted statement and was misleading.

(a) While these actions in themselves resulted in some misunderstanding in the minds of duty officers in both the EUCOM and NAVEUCOM Command Centers as to who had the action responsibility, delay in dissemination of these operational directives cannot be solely attributed to the JCS/JRC action in initially bypassing CINCEUR, since verbal confirmation of the authenticity of these instructions (Date-Time-Group of JCS message) via secure voice communication was received by the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer simultaneously with his being handed a hard copy of the message.

(b) It can be further deduced that the existence of a verbal CINCUSNAVEUR policy requiring verification, either in the form of a message Date-Time-Group or call from a General/Flag officer, before action can be taken on telephone instructions emanating from higher headquarters, effectively precluded exercise of judgment by the duty officer and the possibility of an earlier response on the part of the LIBERTY.

(2) The JCS message directive regarding new geographical constraints for USS LIBERTY movements was transmitted to and received by USCINCEUR approximately two hours after verbal notification. CINCUSNAVEUR received the message directive a, proximately three hours from time of verbal notification. COMSIXTHFLT received the directive via CINCUSNAVEUR four hours and forty-five minutes from notification to USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR. COMSIXTHFLT instructions to LIBERTY were broadcast ten hours and thirty-five minutes from original initiation of the action to relocate LIBERTY.

(3) The reasons for delays on the Flagship of COMSIXTHFLT were internal staffing, a delay in transmitting due to other traffic of the same and higher precedence, and the commander and his staff were deeply involved in high priority press activity directed by DOD and plans for evacuation of dependents.

4. (2) Notification of the additional task to incorporate official US public statements bearing on the findings was received on the afternoon of 15 June 1967. Although Public Affairs statements available in the European Command have been reviewed, those available in the Washington area have not as yet been fully analyzed. All those reviewed to date indicate no bearing on the findings.

5. (2) There appears to be no evidence to indicate the existence at any time of conflicting instructions pertaining to the operation of the USS LIBERTY.

6. (2) The team met with the senior member of the court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR on 15 June 1967 in Malta. In order to preclude infringement upon the prerogatives of that group, information pertaining to receipt and reaction of the LIBERTY to operational directives was obtained by the team from facts previously collected by the court of inquiry. Subsequently, at Hqs CINCUSNAVEUR, an exchange of facts was mutually beneficial to both efforts.

JOSEPH R. RUSS
Major General, USA
Chief, JCCRG

Copy to: Director, Joint Staff